A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, January 24, 2017
JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS (Retired), Complainant, vs. HON. PERLA V. CABRERA-FALLER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas City, Cavite, Respondent.

FACTS

The administrative complaint arose from Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller’s handling of Criminal Case No. 11862-13 for violation of the Anti-Hazing Law ( R.A. No. 8049 ), concerning the death of complainant’s grandson during fraternity initiation rites. After the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an Information and recommended a discharge for a state witness, respondent judge initially found probable cause and issued warrants of arrest on June 3, 2013. However, on June 13, 2013, she recalled the warrants against some accused, claiming they were issued “inadvertently.” Subsequently, on August 15, 2013, she issued an Omnibus Order quashing all warrants and dismissing the case against all accused for lack of probable cause. She discredited the statements of the state witness and other prosecution witnesses, instead accepting the accused’s narrative that the state witness alone inflicted the fatal injuries.
The complainant, a retired judge, alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust order. He argued that her flip-flopping orders—first finding probable cause, then recalling warrants, and finally dismissing the case—demonstrated incompetence and a failure to personally evaluate the evidence as required by the Rules of Court.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure in her handling of the determination of probable cause and the dismissal of the criminal case.

RULING

Yes, respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. The Supreme Court En Banc found her actions constituted gross ignorance of fundamental procedural rules. A judge’s determination of probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest requires a personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the evidence. Her initial finding of probable cause and issuance of warrants on June 3, 2013, was a judicial function. However, her subsequent claim that these warrants were issued “inadvertently” had no legal basis, as a judge cannot issue a warrant by mere inadvertence; it is a deliberate judicial act. This alone demonstrated a blatant disregard for basic procedure.
Furthermore, her ultimate dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause was a grave error. The Court emphasized that a judge’s authority to dismiss a case at the stage of determining probable cause for arrest is limited to instances where the evidence on record “clearly fails to establish probable cause.” The evidence here, including the sworn statements and the prosecutor’s resolution, sufficiently established probable cause to require the case to proceed to trial. By weighing evidence, assessing witness credibility, and making a final determination on guilt or innocence at that preliminary stage, she arrogated the function of a trial on the merits. This constituted gross ignorance of the settled distinction between probable cause for arrest and proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction. Her actions warranted the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, but as she had already retired, the Court instead imposed a fine of P200,000, deductible from her retirement benefits.