G.R. No. RTJ-07-2036; August 20, 2008
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, DIGOS CITY, DAVAO DEL SUR, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Jesus G. Crisologo filed an administrative complaint against Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray for Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay, and Gross Ignorance of the Law. The charges stemmed from the judge’s handling of his Motion for Intervention in two consolidated civil cases concerning the Crisologo family’s ancestral home. The original parties, including complainant’s siblings, submitted a Compromise Agreement ceding the property to Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc. (RBTI). Complainant, claiming co-ownership, moved to intervene to protect his interest. Respondent Judge denied the motion, reasoning intervention would unduly delay the decade-old cases and complainant’s claims should be pursued in a separate action.
Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration, which RBTI opposed for lacking a notice of hearing. Respondent Judge denied the reconsideration on that procedural ground. Crucially, copies of the denial order and a subsequent Decision approving the compromise agreement were erroneously sent to complainant’s former counsel, not his current counsel of record, leaving complainant unaware. Upon learning of RBTI’s motion for execution, complainant filed a notice of appeal and a motion for inhibition. Respondent Judge inhibited herself but took no action on the notice of appeal, leading complainant to believe he lost his appellate remedy.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray is administratively liable for Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision or Order, and Gross Ignorance of the Law in relation to the denial of the Motion for Intervention and the subsequent procedural handling of the case.

RULING

The Supreme Court DISMISSED the administrative complaint. On the denial of the intervention, the Court found no gross ignorance. A judge’s legal error, if not proven to be gross, deliberate, and malicious, is not administratively sanctionable. The ruling on intervention involved a judicial discretion exercised in good faith; thus, correction belongs to judicial appeal, not administrative discipline. Regarding the failure to act on the notice of appeal, the Court explained that an appeal by notice of appeal is perfected upon its filing and payment of fees, not by judicial approval. The trial court’s duty is merely to transmit the records. Since respondent Judge inhibited herself on the 30th day after the notice was filed, any subsequent duty to act on the appeal devolved to her successor. Therefore, she cannot be sanctioned for inaction after her inhibition. The Court emphasized that administrative complaints are not substitutes for adequate judicial remedies, which the complainant availed of by filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.