A.M. No. R-177-MTJ September 24, 1986
ZENAIDA C. SALVADOR, complainant, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO S. SALAMANCA, Presiding Judge, Branch XIV, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Zenaida C. Salvador filed an administrative complaint against Judge Bienvenido S. Salamanca for culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency. The charges stemmed from the alleged delay in resolving a forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 073308) and the motions for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed therein. The complaint was filed on April 26, 1982. The parties rested their case on April 5, 1984, agreeing to submit memoranda within twenty days. The plaintiffs filed their memorandum on May 3, 1984, but the defendants failed to submit theirs. Despite this, and despite an urgent motion for injunction filed on April 18, 1984, the respondent judge deferred action, stating the case was submitted for decision and the injunction motion involved factual issues for the merits.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Salamanca is administratively liable for undue delay in resolving the motions for preliminary injunction and in rendering judgment in the forcible entry case.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge is administratively liable. The Court found irrefutable delay in resolving both the injunction motions and the main case. Forcible entry cases are designed for speedy resolution to prevent breach of peace and restore possession. Rule 70, Section 3 explicitly requires that an application for preliminary injunction be resolved within thirty days. The judge’s failure to act promptly on the motions, filed as early as May 1983 and reiterated in April 1984, constituted a violation of this rule. Regarding the delay in the decision, the judge claimed the case was only deemed submitted after an August 22, 1984 order granting defendants an extension. This was contradicted by his own May 16, 1984 order stating the case was “already been submitted for decision.” The Court ruled that under the agreement, the case was submitted for decision after the twenty-day period for memoranda ended. Following Bendesula v. Laya, the non-submission of a memorandum by a party does not justify delay, as memoranda are not part of trial nor indispensable for decision; their absence is a waiver. Judges must decide based on the records and evidence already presented. The summary nature of ejectment cases demands avoidance of procedural technicalities causing delay. Consequently, Judge Salamanca was REPRIMANDED for the delayed rendition of judgment, with a warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.