A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529. December 16, 2004.
PROS. EDILBERTO L. JAMORA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE A. BERSALES, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, General Santos City, respondent.

FACTS

Prosecutor Edilberto Jamora filed an administrative complaint against Judge Jose Bersales for gross ignorance of the law. The charges stemmed from the judge’s handling of two criminal cases for violations of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). After a preliminary investigation, Judge Bersales found probable cause but recommended bail for all accused. For Criminal Case No. 44232-2, which originally alleged a violation of Section 5 (sale/delivery), a non-bailable offense punishable by life imprisonment to death, the judge later issued an order stating the evidence suggested a violation of Section 11 (possession) instead, a bailable offense. He then granted a motion for bail reduction without a hearing.
Upon review, the City Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause but objected that bail was improperly granted for the non-bailable offense and that the recommended bail for the other case was too low. The Regional Trial Court subsequently cancelled the bond for the non-bailable case. The complainant alleged the judge changed the nature of the charge to justify granting bail and denied the prosecution a hearing on the bail application.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Judge Jose Bersales is administratively liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law for his actions in granting bail.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found Judge Bersales guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The legal logic is clear and stringent. First, a judge’s role in a preliminary investigation is limited to determining probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest or committing the accused to trial. He has no authority to make a final determination on what specific crime was committed or to alter the charge filed; that power resides with the prosecutor who conducts the reinvestigation or files the information. By unilaterally changing the allegation from a non-bailable offense (Sec. 5) to a bailable one (Sec. 11), the judge arrogated a power not vested in him by the Rules of Court.
Second, and more critically, the grant of bail for a capital offense (where the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death) is a matter of right only when evidence of guilt is not strong. A hearing where the prosecution can present its evidence is mandatory to determine this strength. The judge’s failure to conduct such a hearing before granting bail was a blatant disregard of this settled procedural requirement. His claim of having discretion was misplaced, as discretion presupposes compliance with this mandatory hearing. These fundamental errors, being basic and settled rules, constitute gross ignorance, which is inexcusable for a judge who is bound to know the law. The Court imposed a fine of P30,000.00.