AM 96 1349; (April, 1997) (Digest)
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997.
SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., respondent.
FACTS
Complainants, the parents of a deceased victim, charged respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law and rendering an unjust judgment. The Judge initially convicted the accused, Gerardo Marcial, of Homicide and Slight Physical Injuries in two consolidated cases. Upon the accused’s motion for reconsideration, the Judge modified his decision. He applied the mitigating circumstances of “lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong” and “sufficient provocation,” thereby reducing the penalty for Homicide. The complainants argued these mitigating circumstances were legally inapplicable. They contended that “lack of intent” is not a proper mitigating circumstance for crimes against persons where the victim did not die, as the absence of intent to kill is inherent in the crime of physical injuries itself. They also argued that “sufficient provocation” was improperly appreciated, as the alleged provocation (heckling) came from a different victim, not the one killed.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for erroneously applying mitigating circumstances in his amended decision.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court found respondent Judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. The legal logic is clear: a judge is presumed to know the basic doctrines and settled jurisprudence on the application of mitigating circumstances. The Court held that the mitigating circumstance of “lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong” under Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code applies only where the intent is disproportionate to the resulting felony, such as when an act intended for a lesser wrong results in a more grave consequence. It is not applicable to the crime of Slight Physical Injuries, as the absence of intent to kill is already an element of that crime, not a mitigating factor. Furthermore, for “sufficient provocation” under Article 13(4) to be appreciated, it must originate from the offended party. The provocation cited by the judge came from a different individual (Edgar Mabuyo), not from the deceased victim (Maximo Bacar) in the homicide case. Applying it to the homicide charge was a clear misapplication of the law. While the error alone did not constitute “unjust judgment” warranting dismissal, it demonstrated a fundamental ignorance of basic legal principles. The Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with a stern warning. The Judge was also admonished for his undue delay in complying with the Court Administrator’s directives to file his comment on the complaint.
