A.M. No. 801, June 27, 1978
CESARIO ADARNE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Cesario Adarne was a defendant in a protracted forcible entry case. On August 7, 1961, noting his counsel of record was absent, Adarne prevailed upon his third-degree cousin, respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was in court for another matter, to make a special appearance to seek postponement. Observing the plaintiffs were also absent, Aldaba instead moved for dismissal, which was granted. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration; Aldaba filed an opposition, and the motion was denied. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals later set aside the dismissal, remanding the case. On October 23, 1964, Adarne again requested Aldaba’s special appearance. Aldaba argued for allowing the defendants to file a quieting of title action to be heard jointly with the forcible entry case. The court agreed, ordering Adarne to file such action within a week. Subsequently, on June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for non-appearance at a hearing and later rendered an adverse decision. Adarne then filed this administrative complaint, alleging gross negligence and misconduct by Aldaba for failing to protect his interests, leading to the default judgment.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Atty. Damian V. Aldaba is administratively liable for gross negligence and misconduct for his handling of complainant’s case, resulting in a default judgment.

RULING

The Court dismissed the complaint, finding no administrative liability on the part of respondent. The legal logic centers on the formal requirements for attorney substitution and the standard of care owed. The record established that Aldaba only entered a “special appearance” on two specific dates at Adarne’s urgent request, primarily to move for dismissal or to propose a procedural course. He was never formally substituted as counsel of record. The rules mandate that substitution of attorneys requires a written application, client’s written consent, the substituted attorney’s written consent, or notice if consent is unobtainable. None of these formalities were observed here. Consequently, the attorneys originally engaged by Adarne (Attys. Marmita, Mirales, and Casimpan) remained the counsel of record responsible for the case’s general conduct. The default occurred due to the failure of Adarne’s counsel of record to appear at the subsequent hearing, a responsibility not transferred to Aldaba. Furthermore, an attorney is liable only for a reasonable degree of care and skill, not for every error, provided they act in good faith. Aldaba honestly believed his role was limited to the special appearances, and Adarne had agreed to contact his attorney of record thereafter. The burden of proof in disbarment lies with the complainant, and Adarne failed to present convincing proof of gross negligence or culpable malpractice by Aldaba under these circumstances.