G.R. No. A.M. No. 2360-MJ August 31, 1981
SPOUSES TEODORICO MARFIL and TEODORA ESPAÑOLA, complainants, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO CUACHON, respondent.

FACTS

Complainants charged respondent Judge Orlando Cuachon with gross ignorance of the law and acts unbecoming a judge. The case originated from a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D. No. 772) filed by Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, the aunt of the judge’s wife, against complainant Teodorico Marfil. Respondent judge took cognizance of the case, conducted a preliminary examination, and issued a warrant for Marfil’s arrest on January 8, 1980, setting bail at P1,000. Marfil was subsequently apprehended and detained. His counsel later filed a petition for referral to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and a motion to quash, but the judge did not act on these pleadings.
In his defense, respondent judge averred that accepting and preliminarily examining the complaint was a routine ministerial duty. He claimed that during a hearing on February 12, 1980, he attempted to facilitate an amicable settlement and, upon its failure, immediately issued an order inhibiting himself from the case. He argued that having inhibited himself, he could no longer act on the subsequent motions or order the accused’s release.

ISSUE

Whether respondent judge is administratively liable for taking cognizance of and acting upon a case where he was mandatorily disqualified due to affinity within the prohibited degree.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge is administrarily liable. The Supreme Court found the complaint meritorious. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory and explicitly disqualifies a judge from sitting in any case where he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. The aggrieved party in the criminal case was the aunt of the judge’s wife, a relationship well within the prohibited sixth degree of affinity.
The Court held that strict compliance with this disqualification rule is essential to protect the parties’ rights, assure impartial justice, and preserve public confidence in the judiciary. By taking cognizance of the case, conducting the preliminary examination, issuing the arrest warrant, and setting the hearing, respondent judge opened his impartiality to serious question. His subsequent inhibition after it became clear that a settlement was impossible did not cure the initial violation or extenuate his culpability. His actions prior to inhibition demonstrated a failure to observe the mandatory rule from the outset, which constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The Court reprimanded respondent Judge Cuachon with a warning that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.