G.R. No. A.M. No. 23-04-05-SC, July 30, 2024
RE: ILLEGAL CAMPAIGN AND ACTIVITIES IN INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES – CENTRAL LUZON ALLEGEDLY PERPETRATED BY ATTY. NILO DIVINA (Dissenting Opinion, Hernando, J.)

FACTS

The case involves the administrative complaint against Atty. Nilo Divina for his sponsorship of trips (Balesin and Bali) and other activities for officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Central Luzon and other local chapters. The Majority found Atty. Divina guilty of Simple Misconduct for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA), characterizing his sponsorships as “excessive” and having “transcended the bounds of propriety.” The dissenting opinion argues that the charges are based on mere conjectures and a lack of substantial evidence proving any corrupt or ill motive on the part of Atty. Divina, who is portrayed as acting out of pure benevolence.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Nilo Divina should be held administratively liable for Simple Misconduct based solely on the allegedly excessive amount of his sponsorships/donations to IBP activities, in the absence of proof of bad faith, ill intent, or a violation of a specific established rule.

RULING

No. The dissenting opinion concludes that Atty. Divina should not be held administratively liable. The reasoning is as follows:
1. Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof: Atty. Divina enjoys the legal presumption of innocence. The burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish the allegations by substantial evidence. The ponencia itself acknowledged the charge was based on “mere conjectures and surmises.” There is a complete absence of proof that Atty. Divina acted with impropriety, was campaigning, or was spurred by a corrupt motive to influence IBP elections.
2. Definition of Simple Misconduct Not Met: Simple Misconduct requires a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. The ponencia conceded that Atty. Divina did not violate Section 14 of the Revised IBP By-Laws. The finding of misconduct was based on the subjective conclusion that the sponsorships were “unreasonable, unacceptable, and excessive,” but the Majority provided no objective criteria or guideposts for determining such excessiveness or impropriety.
3. No Violation of Specific CPRA Provisions: The alleged violations of CPRA, Canon II, Sections 1 and 2, were not sufficiently demonstrated.
* Section 1 (Prohibiting unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct): “Excessive generosity” does not qualify as an act contrary to law, nor was it shown to be dishonest, immoral, or deceitful. No specific law or rule transgressed was identified.
* Section 2 (Prohibiting scandalous behavior): Atty. Divina’s actions were not shown to be scandalous, as there was no proof of intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The sponsorships were not exclusive to IBP-Central Luzon but were extended to other chapters. The amount being considered “huge” is relative to the donor’s financial capacity.
4. Absence of Ill Motive and Nature of the Act: The act, without proof of bad faith, should be characterized as a pure benevolent act. A generous act, at face value, is a laudable trait. The evaluation of culpability should not be based solely on the amount donated but on the donor’s real intentions, which were not proven to be ill.