A.M. No. 2011-05-SC. June 19, 2018. RE: DECEETEFUL CONDUCT OF IGNACIO S. DEL ROSARIO, CASH CLERK III, RECORDS AND MISCELLANEOUS MATTER SECTION, CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FMO-OCA.
FACTS

Ignacio S. Del Rosario, a Cash Clerk III, was administratively charged based on a letter-complaint from retired sheriff Noel G. Primo. Primo entrusted Del Rosario with ₱34,000.00 to process his retirement papers, with a portion intended for payment of Primo’s financial liability to the court. Del Rosario misappropriated the funds, falsely assuring Primo that the papers were being processed by the GSIS. Upon discovering the deceit, Primo demanded the money’s return, but Del Rosario failed to comply, compelling Primo to file a complaint for dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the service. In his comment, Del Rosario admitted receiving the money but claimed he used it for his son’s hospitalization. He later settled Primo’s obligation, leading Primo to withdraw the complaint. The Office of Administrative Services found Del Rosario liable, recommending a six-month suspension. However, the Court En Banc, in a 2011 Decision, dismissed him from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment.

ISSUE

Whether judicial clemency should be granted to petitioner Ignacio S. Del Rosario, thereby mitigating the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him.

RULING

The Court En Banc denied the petition for clemency. The ruling emphasized that clemency is an act of mercy, not a right, and is granted only under exceptional circumstances where the public’s confidence in the judiciary will not be compromised. The Court applied the guidelines from Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, which require proof of remorse and reformation, a showing that the individual has subsequently maintained a life of integrity, and that the grant will not undermine the integrity of the judicial system. The Court found Del Rosario’s plea lacking. His act of misappropriating funds entrusted to him by a colleague, coupled with his deceitful assurances, constituted a severe breach of trust that directly tarnished the judiciary’s integrity. His restitution was deemed a mere afterthought prompted by fear of sanction, not genuine repentance. The Court held that his 33 years of service and lack of prior offenses were insufficient to offset the gravity of his dishonesty, which exploited the trust inherent in his position. Granting clemency would erode the exacting standards of conduct required of court personnel and diminish public trust. Thus, the higher interest of preserving the judiciary’s integrity prevailed over compassionate considerations.