AM 1833 CFI; (October, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.M. No. 1833-CFI October 10, 1980
VIRGILIO V. DIONISIO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE EMILIO V. SALAS, Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig, Branch I, respondent.
FACTS
In an administrative complaint, Virgilio V. Dionisio charged Judge Emilio V. Salas with falsification of a certificate of work completed, a violation of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act. The charge stemmed from Civil Case No. 26198, where Dionisio had filed a motion for reconsideration on September 10, 1977. The motion was set for hearing on September 30, 1977, after which Judge Salas gave the defendants’ counsel three days to file an opposition, deeming the motion submitted thereafter. Judge Salas failed to resolve this motion within the statutory ninety-day period, which expired on January 16, 1978. Despite this, he allegedly certified on his January 1978 salary voucher that all matters under submission for ninety days or more had been decided, thereby drawing his salary improperly. Dionisio sought Judge Salas’s suspension to prevent potential manipulation of case records.
In his comment, Judge Salas admitted the ninety-day period had lapsed. However, he justified the non-resolution by citing a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 1978, in CA-G.R. No. SP-7382-R (Dionisio vs. Salas). This injunction ordered him to desist from proceeding with the hearing of Civil Case No. 26198 and from enforcing two specified orders, including the one related to the pending motion, until further order from the appellate court. The case was rendered moot by the subsequent death of Judge Salas on August 8, 1980.
ISSUE
Whether Judge Emilio V. Salas is administratively liable for falsification of his certificate of work completed under the Judiciary Act for failing to resolve a motion within ninety days.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit and for being moot. The legal logic centers on the justification for the delay and the supervening event that extinguished the proceeding. While Section 5 of the Judiciary Act mandates judges to certify that all matters under submission for ninety days have been decided before receiving salary, and Judge Salas technically violated this by not resolving the motion by January 16, 1978, his explanation provided a valid legal excuse. The Court of Appeals’ writ of injunction, served on January 6, 1978, expressly prohibited him from proceeding with the case, including acting on the pending motion. This judicial restraint from a higher court constituted a lawful impediment, making it legally improper and impossible for him to resolve the motion within the remaining period. Therefore, his certification, while factually incorrect regarding the motion’s status, was not shown to be a malicious falsification given the binding injunction. Furthermore, the Court noted the complaint had become academic due to Judge Salas’s death, which terminated the administrative proceedings against him. The dismissal was without prejudice to the underlying judicial processes in the related cases.
