A.M. No. 1551 July 21, 1977
Luis D. Santos vs. Atty. Nilo S. Tuason

FACTS

The case originated from a business transaction where Luis D. Santos purchased shares from Atty. Nilo S. Tuason. Santos issued postdated checks for the balance, several of which were dishonored. After Santos failed to settle the remaining debt and transferred the shares to a third party, Tuazon filed a civil case for collection in 1974. Subsequently, not content with the civil action, Tuazon, through his own counsel, initiated a criminal complaint for estafa against Santos with the provincial fiscal in 1975. The fiscal filed the corresponding information in court. However, upon reinvestigation and a motion by the fiscal, the criminal case was dismissed in August 1975.
In retaliation, Santos filed this disbarment complaint against Tuazon in October 1975, alleging that the lawyer committed a serious ethical breach by instigating a false and malicious criminal suit. During the investigation by the Solicitor General, Santos manifested his desire to withdraw the complaint, adopting a “forgive and forget” attitude. Tuazon objected to the dismissal and insisted on continuing the proceedings to clear his name, completing the presentation of his evidence.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Nilo S. Tuazon’s act of filing a criminal complaint for estafa against his debtor, which was later dismissed, constitutes malicious prosecution warranting his disbarment.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the disbarment complaint. The legal logic centers on the interpretation of grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court held that Tuazon’s conduct did not fall within the enumerated grounds, such as deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct, or conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. While the rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is not strictly applied to disbarment, the act must still be reprehensible enough to demonstrate unfitness for the legal profession.
The Court found no such reprehensible conduct. Tuazon acted in good faith to protect his interests after Santos issued bouncing checks and failed to pay a substantial debt. The separate filing of civil and criminal actions for estafa is legally permissible under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Evidence showed Tuazon had warned Santos of this intention years prior, indicating no malicious intent but a legitimate effort to seek redress. Conversely, Santos admitted his disbarment complaint was a vindictive retaliatory act. Therefore, Tuazon’s actions, undertaken after a significant delay and culminating in a favorable civil judgment for him, did not constitute the malicious prosecution required for the extreme penalty of disbarment.