AM 1387 Mj; (November, 1980) (Digest)
A.M. No. 1387-MJ. November 17, 1980. LOURDES FLOR, complainant, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR. of Paranaque, Metro Manila, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Lourdes Flor charged Municipal Judge Nicanor Cruz, Jr. with misfeasance for his actions in three criminal cases involving her. The specific allegations included: changing a promulgated judgment from conviction to acquittal in Criminal Case No. 34315; causing an undue delay of several years in disposing of cases filed in mid-1972; rendering an unjust judgment; making a wrong translation of testimony; issuing a subpoena with insufficient notice; and violating various procedural rules. Flor claimed that on April 1, 1976, she and her counsel discovered an unpromulgated decision convicting the accused, but the judgment later promulgated on May 28, 1976, acquitted the same accused, leading her to conclude the judge improperly altered the decision.
In his comment, Judge Cruz denied the charges. He explained the judgment was promulgated on August 19, 1976, after resettings due to his illness, and he had not prepared any decision by April 1, making the claim of seeing a conviction impossible. He attributed the delay to the complainant’s protracted presentation of evidence, which he allowed to give her a full chance. He stated the subpoena was for a confrontation to explore settlement and challenged the other allegations as lacking factual basis or being misapprehensions of his authority.
ISSUE
Whether Municipal Judge Nicanor Cruz, Jr. should be held administratively liable for the charges of misfeasance, particularly for allegedly altering a judgment and causing undue delay in case disposition.
RULING
The Court dismissed most charges but found the respondent administratively liable for undue delay. The complainant failed to establish a prima facie case for the majority of her allegations. Regarding the central claim of changing a judgment, the Court found no sufficient proof; even assuming a judge alters an unpromulgated decision, such an act falls within judicial discretion before finality and is not inherently improper. The other charges, concerning procedural rules and translation, were not well-founded and stemmed from a misapprehension of the judge’s authority under the Rules.
However, the Court emphasized that the nearly four-year delay in disposing of cases filed in 1972 was inexcusable and could not be countenanced. While the respondent cited illness and the complainant’s presentation of evidence, these did not justify such protracted delay. The Court reiterated the imperative for speedy justice, citing Escabillas vs. Martinez, noting that delay congests dockets, causes loss of evidence, and brings the judiciary into disrepute. Consequently, the charges except for undue delay were dismissed. Judge Cruz was admonished to be more prompt in case disposition to avoid future complaints, and a copy of the resolution was ordered placed in his personal record.