G.R. No. A.M. No. 1096-CFI and A.M. No. 1114-CFI. May 31, 1976.
ROLANDO BARTOLOME and FRANCISCO GREGO, complainants, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, District Judge, Court of First Instance, Manila, respondent.

FACTS

Two separate administrative complaints were filed against Judge Juan de Borja. In the first, Rolando Bartolome, a labor regulation officer, charged the judge with oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct. The charge stemmed from Civil Case No. 94698, a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by Adelina Velasco against the Department of Labor. Respondent Judge granted Velasco’s request to play in court a taped telephone conversation between her and complainant Bartolome, which was made without Bartolome’s knowledge. The tape contained information damaging to Bartolome’s reputation. Bartolome alleged this act violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Act and libel laws, and was intended to discredit the Secretary of Labor and the President.
In the second complaint, Francisco Grego, an accused in a libel case before respondent Judge’s court, charged him with serious misconduct, oppression, and being arbitrary. Grego had filed multiple motions for postponement of his arraignment and trial, primarily on the ground that the Department of Justice was reviewing the case. After several postponements from March to August 1975, and upon Grego’s absence on August 22, respondent Judge issued a warrant for his arrest. Grego alleged the judge acted with visible indignation and used intemperate language.

ISSUE

Whether the acts of respondent Judge, as alleged in the two administrative complaints, constitute serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, or oppression warranting disciplinary action.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed both complaints for lack of merit. The Court emphasized that while administrative charges often arise from a deep sense of grievance, leading to exaggeration, a judge’s exercise of judicial discretion, even if another judge might have ruled differently, does not automatically constitute an administrative offense. The Court must safeguard judicial independence and not hold judges to a strict degree of accountability for discretionary acts performed in good faith.
Regarding Bartolome’s complaint, the Court found no violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act by the judge. The law penalizes specific acts of interception, recording, or using such recordings; merely allowing the playback in a judicial proceeding where the evidence was offered by a party does not fall under these prohibited acts. On the alleged admission of libelous testimony, the judge correctly ruled that he could not refuse evidence merely because it was derogatory, especially when the adverse party did not object. His actions were within the scope of his discretion in determining the relevance of evidence to the petition for prohibition and mandamus, which alleged grave abuse of discretion and improper motives.
Concerning Grego’s complaint, the Court found that the respondent Judge’s issuance of a warrant after repeated postponements and absence of the accused was a legitimate exercise of authority to prevent obstruction of justice. While a judge should always personify equanimity, it is understandable for a judge to be visibly annoyed or to use strong language when faced with persistent dilatory tactics. Such reaction, under the circumstances, did not amount to the serious misconduct or oppression required for disciplinary action. The complaints were therefore dismissed.