A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC; August 19, 2009
RE: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi Re Exemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.

FACTS

Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., sought clarification from the Supreme Court. The Foundation, a non-stock corporation established to aid the poorest and most abandoned members of society, had previously been allowed by the Court to pay a nominal filing fee for a collection case, with the balance payable upon successful execution. However, the Court Administrator noted the need for compliance with OCA Circular No. 42-2005 and Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which govern exemptions from legal fees. Mr. Prioreschi queried whether the courts could grant his Foundation, which works for indigent and underprivileged people, the same exemption from payment of legal fees that is granted to indigent individual litigants. He highlighted that the existing rules appear detailed and focused solely on “individual indigents,” causing executive judges to hesitate due to fear of accusations of favoritism.

ISSUE

Whether a juridical entity, such as the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., can be granted exemption from payment of legal and filing fees on the basis that it works for indigent and underprivileged people.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the Courts cannot grant such an exemption to foundations or juridical persons. The constitutional basis for exemption is Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution , which guarantees free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. This right is implemented through specific rules, particularly Section 19 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which explicitly defines an “indigent litigant” with reference to personal income and property ownership. The clear intent and precise language of these provisions indicate that only a natural person can qualify as an indigent litigant. A corporation like the Good Shepherd Foundation is a juridical person, a legal entity separate from its members, and as such, cannot experience the condition of “poverty” as contemplated by the Constitution and the rules. The worthy nature of its charitable work for the indigent is legally irrelevant to the qualification for the fee exemption. Extending the exemption to juridical entities could open the rule to abuse and impose impractical administrative burdens on the courts for verification. Therefore, the request for exemption was denied.