AC 9831; (March, 2016) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.C. No. 9831. March 09, 2016
Chan Shun Kuen, Complainant, vs. Commissioners Lourdes B. Coloma-Javier, Gregorio O. Bilog III, Raul Tagle Aquino and Atty. Joyrich M. Golangco, Respondents.
FACTS
The disbarment case is an offshoot of a labor case entitled Felisa B. Toribio, et al., v. Compromise Enterprises Corporation and/or Margaret So Chan, decided against complainant Chan Shun Kuen’s company, Compromise Enterprises Corporation (CEC). The NLRC Third Division’s Decision dated October 16, 2007, ordered CEC to pay separation pay. CEC failed to appeal, making the decision final and executory, leading to the levy of CEC’s property. Instead of appealing to the appellate court, the complainant filed a series of administrative and criminal complaints against the NLRC respondents before different bodies, all of which were dismissed. The complainant then filed the instant disbarment complaint, alleging that the respondents connived in writing the NLRC decision and that a commissioner’s signature was forged. The respondents countered that the complaint was an act of forum shopping, motivated by malice, and a harassing suit to overturn the labor decision and stop the execution proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether the respondents should be disbarred based on the complainant’s allegations of connivance and forgery in relation to their official functions as NLRC Commissioners and a Deputy Executive Clerk.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the disbarment complaint for utter lack of merit. The Court held that the burden of proof in disbarment cases rests on the complainant, who must establish the complaint with clearly preponderant evidence showing that the lawyer is wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor. The complainant’s allegations were mere hollow suppositions without evidence. There was no proof of connivance, manifest partiality, bad faith, malice, or gross negligence in the respondents’ performance of their judicial functions. The Court found the complaint to be an ill-motivated, vindictive charge meant to harass the respondents for deciding against the complainant, noting it was a virtual duplicate of previously dismissed administrative complaints (A.C. No. 8040 and A.C. No. 8621). The complainant was admonished for filing a malicious complaint and sternly warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely as indirect contempt.