AC 7973; (February, 2015) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015
Melvyn G. Garcia, Complainant, vs. Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, Respondent.
FACTS
Two consolidated complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia against Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño. In A.C. No. 7973, filed on 30 July 2008, Garcia alleged that Sesbreño, while representing Garcia’s daughters in a support case, was convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 and was only on parole, and that homicide is a crime of moral turpitude warranting disbarment. A.C. No. 10457 originated from a similar complaint (CBC Case No. 08-2273) filed before the IBP-CBD on 29 July 2008, alleging Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 by practicing law despite his homicide conviction. Sesbreño argued the complaint was motivated by resentment for his pro bono representation of Garcia’s daughters, claimed his sentence was commuted, and contended homicide does not involve moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD consolidated the cases, found the circumstances of the homicide involved moral turpitude, and recommended disbarment, which the IBP Board of Governors approved. Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
The sole issue is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude, warranting disbarment.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court disbarred Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño. The Court adopted the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD, approving its resolutions. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. While homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the circumstances, the Court reviewed its prior decision in People v. Sesbreño and agreed with the IBP-CBD that the specific circumstances showed moral turpitude. The evidence established that Sesbreño, without provocation, fired his rifle at the victim and his companion who were merely passing by his house, leading to the victim’s death, displaying extreme arrogance and a cruel, vindictive character. The Court rejected Sesbreño’s argument that executive clemency restored his rights, noting the commutation was a mere reduction of penalty and the accessory penalties subsisted, and that the practice of law is a privilege requiring good moral character.