AC 7360; (July, 2012) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.C. No. 7360; July 24, 2012
Atty. Policario I. Catalan, Jr., Complainant, vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa, Respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Atty. Catalan filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Silvosa based on three causes of action. First, Atty. Silvosa, a former Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, appeared as private counsel for the accused in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (People v. Esperon), a case for double frustrated murder where he had previously acted as the public prosecutor. Atty. Catalan, a private complainant in that case, alleged this violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Second, Atty. Catalan presented an affidavit and testimony from former Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio, who stated that Atty. Silvosa, while still a prosecutor, offered her P30,000 to alter her findings in a separate case. Third, Atty. Catalan submitted a Sandiganbayan decision convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery in Criminal Case No. 27776. The conviction stemmed from an entrapment operation where Atty. Silvosa, as a prosecutor, demanded P15,000 for the dismissal of a case and release of a detainee.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa should be disbarred based on the grounds alleged in the complaint.
RULING
Yes, Atty. Silvosa is disbarred. The Supreme Court found him liable for all three causes of action, with the conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude being decisive. On the first cause, the Court held that Atty. Silvosa clearly violated Rule 6.03 by accepting engagement in a matter he intervened in during government service. His act of filing a motion for bail as private counsel, after having prosecuted the case, established a lawyer-client relationship and constituted prohibited representation. On the second cause, the Court found the testimony of Pros. Toribio credible, demonstrating Atty. Silvosa’s attempt to corrupt a colleague.
Most critically, the Court ruled that Atty. Silvosa’s conviction for direct bribery constitutes a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as it involves moral turpitude. The crime reflects gross dishonesty and a betrayal of public trust, characteristics utterly incompatible with the integrity required of a lawyer. The Court rejected his defense that the conviction pertained only to his capacity as a public officer, not as a lawyer, stating that the distinction is immaterial as the act indelibly stains his moral character. The practice of law is a privilege reserved for those with good moral character. Atty. Silvosa’s actions—representing conflicting interests, attempting to bribe a fellow prosecutor, and being convicted for direct bribery—collectively demonstrate a pattern of unethical conduct and a predisposition to violate the law and professional standards. Consequently, he is deemed unfit to remain a member of the Bar.