G.R. No. A.C. No. 3360; January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Fe T. Tuanda received jewelry from Herminia Marquez on a consignment basis, agreeing to remit proceeds and return unsold items by February 14, 1984. Failing to return unsold jewelry valued at approximately P26,250.00, Tuanda issued three post-dated checks to Marquez. All checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficient funds. Despite notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no arrangements to fund the accounts or settle her obligation.
Consequently, three informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) were filed against her. The Regional Trial Court convicted her on all counts, imposing fines and indemnification. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the decision by ordering Tuanda’s suspension from the practice of law, citing that the offense involved moral turpitude and invoking Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Tuanda’s subsequent procedural misstep—filing a Notice of Appeal instead of a petition for review on certiorari—led the Supreme Court to declare the CA decision final. She then filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, arguing her actions were motivated by a sincere belief in her innocence and lacked intent to cause damage.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ordered the suspension of Atty. Fe T. Tuanda from the practice of law based on her conviction for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion and affirmed the suspension. The Court held that conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, warranting disciplinary action against a lawyer. The legal logic rests on the nature of the offense as defined in Lozano v. Martinez: the gravamen is the act of issuing a worthless check, which is an offense against public order, not merely a private wrong. This act pollutes trade channels, injures the banking system, and harms public interest, thus involving deceit and moral turpitude.
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 explicitly authorize the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court emphasized that good moral character is a continuing requirement for law practice. Tuanda’s violation of B.P. Blg. 22, a serious criminal law, also constitutes a breach of her attorney’s oath to obey the laws and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Her claim of lack of intent to cause damage is immaterial to the disciplinary proceeding, which focuses on the fact of conviction and the nature of the crime. Therefore, the suspension was a proper consequence of her conviction for crimes involving moral turpitude, and she shall remain suspended until further orders.