G.R. No. Adm. Case No. 2093, June 22, 1984
Calixto Yap alias Yap Souy Huat, complainant, vs. Benjamin S. Somera, respondent.

FACTS

Complainant Calixto Yap accused respondent Atty. Benjamin S. Somera of irregular practice of law. The complaint stemmed from Atty. Somera’s intervention in a civil case where Yap was the prevailing plaintiff. Yap had obtained an alias writ of execution, leading to the levy and sale of a parcel of land belonging to the defendant, after which a final deed of sale and a transfer certificate of title were issued in Yap’s favor. Yap alleged that long after the case was closed, the defendant, aided by Atty. Somera, filed a petition to reopen the case based on misleading or erroneous allegations, which the court entertained.
During the pendency of the administrative case, Atty. Benjamin S. Somera passed away on November 24, 1981. The Solicitor General, to whom the case was referred for investigation, reported that the case had become moot and academic due to the respondent’s death. However, the Solicitor General proceeded to evaluate the merits of the complaint and submitted a recommendation.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Benjamin S. Somera acted in bad faith or engaged in irregular practice of law by filing a petition to annul the sale of the land in favor of the complainant.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Although the respondent’s death rendered the case moot, the Court resolved the substantive issue to publicly clear the lawyer’s name. The core inquiry was whether Atty. Somera acted in good faith in filing the petition to annul the sale.
The Court, agreeing with the Solicitor General’s findings, held that the respondent acted in good faith and with a prima facie legal basis. The Solicitor General pointed out two substantial grounds. First, the alias writ of execution authorizing the sale was issued on November 9, 1966, but the sale was conducted on May 15, 1975—almost nine years later. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment may no longer be enforced by motion after five years from its finality, but only by a separate action. This temporal gap provided a basis to question the writ’s continuing efficacy. Second, the sale was allegedly made without the notice by publication required under Section 18, Rule 39, a procedural defect that, if true, would render the sale vulnerable to annulment. Given these legal points, Atty. Somera’s actions were not frivolous or malicious but were anchored on arguable legal grounds. Therefore, no administrative liability for irregular practice could be sustained.