AC 179 J; (March, 1971) (Digest)
G.R. No. A.C. No. 179-J March 15, 1971
CONRADO MONTALBAN, complainant, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, respondent.
FACTS
Complainant Conrado Montalban filed an administrative complaint against then Judge Mateo Canonoy of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, charging him with favoritism, partiality, ignorance of the law, vindictiveness, incompetence, and dereliction of duty. The charges stemmed from the judge’s handling of three cases involving Montalban and his wife, Hiltruda Gacusan Montalban. Specifically, Montalban alleged it was suspicious that all three cases were raffled to Judge Canonoy’s sala, that his motions were consistently denied while his wife’s were granted, and that his wife had improper ex parte access to the judge’s chambers. The complaint also cited the judge’s acquittal of Mrs. Montalban in an adultery case and certain orders in a civil case for support and custody.
Judge Canonoy, in his answer, categorically denied all charges. He explained that case assignment was done by regular raffle, as supported by an affidavit from the Clerk of Court. Regarding the alleged chamber visits, he submitted affidavits from court personnel attesting that Mrs. Montalban was only in his chambers with her lawyer and the complainant for settlement discussions. He defended his judicial actions as legally sound.
ISSUE
Whether the allegations against Judge Mateo Canonoy constitute sufficient grounds for administrative disciplinary action.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On the charge of favoritism and partiality, the Court found no basis. The coincidence of case assignment was not unusual, and the affidavit of the Clerk of Court confirmed the regularity of the raffle. The sworn denials of ex parte communications, corroborated by court personnel, were deemed credible. The Court noted that the judge’s decision to acquit Mrs. Montalban and his orders in the civil case, which were later affirmed by the Court of Appeals, were legally justified, negating any inference of bias.
Regarding ignorance of the law, the Court found the charges unsubstantiated. The orders in the civil case for support and custody, which compelled a lessee to vacate the conjugal home, were upheld by the Court of Appeals as a valid exercise of the court’s contempt powers to enforce its lawful mandates. The judge’s act of filing an answer in the appellate case, while technically unnecessary, was not a culpable act of ignorance. The reservation in the acquittal judgment regarding a potential civil action for attorney’s fees was deemed a legal nullity, having no practical effect on the parties’ rights.
The charge of vindictiveness, based on the timing of the adultery case hearing and acquittal following an appellate injunction, was also rejected. The Court examined the acquittal decision and found the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case, making the acquittal proper. The judge’s action was construed as upholding the accused’s right to a speedy trial, not as retaliation. Since the charges of incompetence and dereliction were mere summations of the other dismissed charges, they likewise could not stand. The Court concluded that the complainant failed to present clear and convincing evidence to warrant any disciplinary action against the respondent judge.
