G.R. No. A.C. No. 1596 June 28, 1983
Maxima Murillo Vda. de Garbe, complainant, vs. Rodrigo A. Liporada, respondent.

FACTS

On March 12, 1976, Maxima Murillo Vda. de Garbe filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Rodrigo A. Liporada for gross misconduct. The complaint alleged that Liporada notarized a special power of attorney wherein the right-hand thumbmark of his common-law wife, Alegria Banaag, was made to appear as the thumbmark of Mrs. Garbe. Using this falsified document, Banaag was able to procure and allegedly misappropriate Mrs. Garbe’s pension checks from the Army Finance Center. Banaag subsequently became Liporada’s lawful wife.
The Court, in a resolution dated June 23, 1976, required Mrs. Garbe to comment on Liporada’s motion to suspend the disbarment proceedings pending the outcome of a related criminal case for estafa through falsification of public documents (Criminal Case No. Q-6236) filed against the Liporada spouses. The spouses were acquitted in a decision dated May 23, 1977, with the court finding Banaag acted without deceit and Liporada acted in good faith, believing the thumbmark was genuinely affixed by Mrs. Garbe. Mrs. Garbe and her counsel, Atty. Leven S. Puno, failed to file the required comment.

ISSUE

Whether the administrative disbarment case against Atty. Rodrigo A. Liporada should be dismissed in light of his acquittal in the related criminal case and the complainant’s failure to prosecute.

RULING

Yes, the case is dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint based on two primary grounds. First, the acquittal in the criminal case, while not conclusively binding in disbarment proceedings, carried significant evidentiary weight. The trial court’s finding that Liporada acted in good faith and without deceit in notarizing the document directly negated the core allegation of gross misconduct, which requires a showing of corrupt intent or willful violation of duty. An act done in good faith, even if negligent, does not typically constitute the gross misconduct warranting disbarment.
Second, and decisively, the Court emphasized the complainant’s procedural default and loss of interest in prosecuting the case. Despite two separate Court resolutions—one in 1976 and another in 1982—directing Mrs. Garbe and her lawyer to comment on the respondent’s motions (first for suspension and later for dismissal based on acquittal), they consistently failed to comply. This failure to pursue the charges was construed as an abandonment of the complaint. The administrative power to discipline lawyers is exercised for the public welfare, but it is not the Court’s duty to prosecute a case for a complainant who has demonstrably lost interest. The combined effect of the favorable criminal adjudication on the merits and the complainant’s abandonment justified the dismissal and closure of the disbarment proceeding.