SUBJECT: THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES UNDER THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Philippine government is established upon the fundamental principle of a tripartite system, where powers are distributed among three co-equal, coordinate, and independent branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. This structural design is not merely a matter of administrative convenience but a deliberate constitutional safeguard intended to prevent the concentration of arbitrary power in any single body. The doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances serve as the twin pillars of our republican democracy, ensuring that the government remains one of laws and not of men. This memorandum explores the theoretical underpinnings, constitutional basis, and judicial application of these doctrines within the Philippine legal framework.
II. THEORY OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of Separation of Powers ordains that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. It is founded on the premise that “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands… may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
Complementing this is the Doctrine of Checks and Balances, which provides that the Constitution has provided for certain instances where one branch is allowed to resist the encroachments of another or to participate in the acts of another to ensure that no branch oversteps its constitutional boundaries. This creates a system of “interdependence by check and balance” rather than absolute independence. A corollary to these is the Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers, which dictates that “what has been delegated cannot be delegated” (potestas delegata non delegari potest), ensuring that the branch to which a power is assigned remains responsible for its exercise.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES AND PROVISIONS
The 1987 Constitution does not explicitly state “Separation of Powers,” but it is manifested through the distinct grants of authority in the following articles:
1. Article VI, Section 1: Vests legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
2. Article VII, Section 1: Vests executive power in the President of the Philippines.
3. Article VIII, Section 1: Vests judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
4. Article IX: Establishes the Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit) as independent bodies to further insulate key functions from political interference.
IV. JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has historically acted as the “moderating power” to define the boundaries of these branches.
In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, the Court established that the Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. It clarified that the Judiciary does not assert supremacy over other branches but rather asserts the supremacy of the Constitution.
In Belgica v. Ochoa, the Court struck down the Pork Barrel System (PDAF), ruling that it violated the principle of separation of powers by allowing legislators to participate in the post-enactment phase of budget executiona purely executive function.
In Araullo v. Aquino, the Court addressed the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), reiterating that while the Executive has discretion in budget execution, it cannot cross the line into legislation by re-appropriating funds in a manner not authorized by law, thereby violating the separation of powers.
V. RULES AND PROCEDURAL APPLICATIONS
The application of these doctrines is often mediated through the “Political Question Doctrine” and the “Expanded Jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 1.
1. Political Question Doctrine: Traditionally, courts refrain from resolving issues that are constitutionally committed to the discretion of the legislative or executive branches.
2. Expanded Jurisdiction: The 1987 Constitution narrowed the scope of the political question doctrine by mandating that the Judiciary determine whether there has been a “grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
3. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: Provides the procedural vehicle (Certiorari and Prohibition) for the Judiciary to check acts of other branches that overstep constitutional bounds.
VI. SYNTHESIS
The interplay between the three branches is a delicate balance of “blended powers.” For instance, while the President (Executive) signs bills into law, the Congress (Legislative) can override a veto. While Congress passes laws, the Supreme Court (Judiciary) can declare them unconstitutional. While the President appoints members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions, the Commission on Appointments (Legislative) must confirm them. This synergy ensures that the government operates as a harmonious whole, where the exercise of power is always subject to constitutional limitations and oversight. The separation is not a “hermetic sealing off” of the branches but a functional division intended to promote efficiency and liberty.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances are indispensable to the Philippine constitutional order. They serve as the primary defense against authoritarianism and ensure that the exercise of sovereign power remains within the limits prescribed by the people through the Constitution. As the “final arbiter” of constitutional disputes, the Judiciary plays a critical role in maintaining this equilibrium, ensuring that no branch of government becomes a law unto itself.
VIII. RELATED JURISPRUDENCE AND LAWS
1. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Articles VI, VII, and VIII.
2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) – Establishing the role of the Judiciary in the tripartite system.
3. Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 – Ruling on the unconstitutionality of the legislative “Pork Barrel.”
4. Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 – Defining the limits of executive power over appropriations.
5. Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005 – Discussing the shared power between the Executive and Legislative in treaty-making.
6. Bengzon v. Sen. Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89163, December 2, 1991 – Limiting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation when they encroach upon judicial functions.
