I.P.I. No. 16-241-CA-J. November 29, 2016
Clemente F. Atoc, Complainant, vs. Edgardo A. Camello, Oscar V. Badelles and Perpetua T. Atal-Paño, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, Respondents.

FACTS

The complaint stemmed from resolutions issued by the respondent Court of Appeals (CA) Justices in consolidated petitions filed by then-Cagayan de Oro City Mayor Oscar Moreno and City Treasurer Glenn Bañez. The Office of the Ombudsman had found them administratively guilty of grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal. The DILG implemented the dismissal order on November 12, 2015, leading to the swearing-in of new local officials. The following day, November 13, the CA issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman’s decision. Subsequently, the CA clarified that the TRO effectively restored the status quo ante, meaning Moreno and Bañez should be reinstated to their positions pending resolution of the main petition. The CA later issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Complainant Clemente F. Atoc, a city resident, filed this administrative case charging the respondent Justices with gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality, and violations of various ethical codes and statutes. He essentially argued that the CA acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO and subsequent resolutions, particularly by restoring officials who had already been formally replaced.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Justices are administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or misconduct for issuing the TRO and related resolutions in the petitions filed by Moreno and Bañez.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The Court emphasized that administrative liability of judges requires more than mere error in judgment; it requires proof of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or gross ignorance that is deliberate and malicious. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy to challenge the correctness of a judicial order, absent a clear showing of such malicious intent or gross ignorance.
The Court explained that the propriety of issuing a TRO is a judicial question, not an administrative one. The remedy against an allegedly erroneous TRO is judicial—through a motion for reconsideration and, if denied, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Only a final judicial pronouncement, such as a certiorari grant nullifying the TRO, could potentially provide a basis for an administrative charge if it indicates gross ignorance. The Court noted that its ruling in Binay, Jr. v. Ombudsman—which upheld the CA’s authority to issue a TRO against an Ombudsman dismissal order pending appeal—removed the respondents’ actions from the ambit of gross ignorance of the law. The complaint, therefore, attempted to use an administrative proceeding as a substitute for unavailable or lost judicial remedies, which is impermissible.