Ipi 12 205 CA J; (December, 2013) (Digest)
G.R. No. IPI No. 12-205-CA-J EN BANC; December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461. x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x A.C. No. 10300 RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
FACTS
The Court previously dismissed an administrative complaint filed by Tomas S. Merdegia, through his counsel Atty. Homobono Adaza II, against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. The complaint alleged bias based on Justice Veloso’s conduct during oral arguments and his subsequent denial of a motion for inhibition. In the same resolution dismissing the complaint, the Court directed Atty. Adaza to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Atty. Adaza explained that he was merely performing his duty as counsel, having first advised his client to file a motion for inhibition and only assisting with the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso denied that motion, believing in the merits of his client’s grievance.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Homobono Adaza II is guilty of indirect contempt for filing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso.
RULING
Yes, Atty. Adaza is guilty of indirect contempt. The Court found his explanation insufficient. The administrative complaint was based on the same grounds as the earlier motion for inhibition, which Justice Veloso denied in a resolution he was authorized to write under the Court of Appeals’ Internal Rules. The proper judicial remedy against an unfavorable ruling on a motion for inhibition is a petition for certiorari, not an administrative complaint. Administrative proceedings cannot substitute for judicial remedies against an assailed ruling.
While a lawyer must represent a client with zeal, this duty is bounded by law and includes the obligation to counsel clients on the propriety of legal actions and to encourage respect for legal processes. The administrative complaint displayed a failure to understand that allegations of bias must stem from extrajudicial sources, not merely from adverse rulings or case developments. The totality of circumstances, including Atty. Adaza’s pattern of filing motions for inhibition against other judges and justices after unfavorable orders, revealed the administrative complaint as an attempt to malign the administration of justice. Such conduct tends to degrade the judiciary and improperly interferes with judicial functions, constituting indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The Court balanced the need for judicial accountability with the protection of the judiciary from vexatious litigants, finding Atty. Adaza’s actions contemptuous.