G.R. No. L-9951, December 3, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. A. A. ADDISON, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On December 23, 1912, the appellant, A. A. Addison, subscribed and swore to an affidavit before the Court of First Instance, stating that on or about December 20, 1912, he saw various bottles containing opium compounds in an aparador (cabinet) in the house of John McStay in Lucena, Tayabas. Based on this affidavit, the court issued a search warrant. The sheriff executed the warrant on the same day but found no contraband in McStay’s premises.

Subsequently, on January 3, 1913, John McStay filed a sworn complaint charging Addison with the crime of “malicious prosecution” under Section 106 of General Orders No. 58. McStay alleged that Addison procured the search warrant maliciously and without probable cause, with the intent to gratify personal resentment. The provincial fiscal filed a formal complaint based on these allegations on April 11, 1913. After trial, the lower court convicted Addison and sentenced him to pay a fine of P100, indemnify McStay P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and pay the costs.

At trial, the prosecution presented witnesses to prove malice and lack of probable cause. McStay testified that Addison left his hotel on December 23 after a disturbance caused by other guests, and that the search damaged his business reputation, causing a loss of P500. An internal-revenue agent, Thomas Hoey, testified that he induced Addison to make the affidavit after Addison stated opium could be found with McStay.

The defense presented witnesses to establish probable cause. Joseph Rosemblatt and Charles R. Duffin testified that they had seen opium in an aparador in the same hotel before and during McStay’s ownership. Benigna Robles, a dancing girl at McStay’s salon, testified that two days before Christmas, she saw Hoey and McStay conversing, after which a man named Henson removed bottles from the aparador just before the search.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellant, A. A. Addison, is guilty of violating Section 106 of General Orders No. 58 for procuring a search warrant “maliciously and without probable cause.”

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted the appellant.

The Court held that for a conviction under Section 106 of General Orders No. 58, both malice and absence of probable cause must concur. Malice in law is any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to injure another. Probable cause is defined as such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as would warrant a cautious man in believing that his action and the means taken are legally just and proper.

The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove either element beyond reasonable doubt.
1. On Malice: The fact that no opium was found does not, by itself, prove malice. The testimony indicated that Addison, as an informer, may have been motivated by the prospect of a reward under the Opium Law rather than personal malice. McStay himself testified that he and Addison were friends and had no prior trouble.
2. On Probable Cause: The defense presented credible evidence that created reasonable grounds for Addison’s belief. Rosemblatt and Duffin testified to having seen opium in the hotel’s aparador around the time McStay owned or was acquiring it. Benigna Robles’s testimony suggested that McStay may have been warned and removed the contraband before the search. The prosecution’s attempt to impeach Robles’s presence in Lucena was insufficient.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the appellant acted with probable cause and without malice. The judgment of the lower court was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted, with costs de oficio.