G.R. No. L-9878, December 24, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANK TUPASI MOLINA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
On September 10, 1912, the defendant, Frank Tupasi Molina, signed and swore to an application (Municipal Form No. 11) before a notary public to take the examination for the municipal police service in Ilocos Sur. In said application, he answered “No, sir; I cannot remember any” to Question No. 5, which asked whether he had ever been indicted, tried, or sentenced for violating any law, ordinance, or regulation. However, it was established that prior to that date, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced in two criminal cases: one for disturbing the public peace and another for injurias graves (grave insults) in the justice of the peace court of Tayum, Ilocos Sur, and on appeal to the Court of First Instance. The defendant admitted he was the same person convicted in those cases but claimed he used the name “Frank Tupasi y Molina” instead of “Francisco Tupasi” and that he misunderstood the question. He was charged with perjury under Section 3 of Act No. 1697. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to two months imprisonment, a fine of ₱100, and disqualification from holding public office or giving testimony until the sentence is reversed. The defendant appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is guilty of the crime of perjury under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 for making a false statement under oath in his application for the police service examination.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Court held that:

2. The false statement was material and willful. The defendant’s answer to Question No. 5 was false, as he had prior convictions. The requirement of having no criminal record was material to eligibility for the police examination. The defendant’s claim of misunderstanding the question was untenable, as he was literate in Spanish and the form contained instructions to seek clarification if any question was not understood. His use of a slightly different name (“Frank” instead of “Francisco”) did not negate his identity or his knowledge of the falsity.
3. The mental element for perjury was present. Under Section 3 of Act No. 1697, perjury requires that the accused willfully states or subscribes to a material matter “which he does not believe to be true.” The Court found that the defendant could not have believed his answer was true, as he knew of his prior convictions. Thus, he made the statement knowing it was false.
4. The dissenting opinion argued that there was no law authorizing the affidavit, citing U.S. v. George. However, the majority held that the affidavit was duly authorized under the regulatory framework established by Act No. 2169.

The sentence of the trial court was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.