G.R. No. L-9831; October 30, 1957
ISAAC PERAL BOWLING ALLEY, petitioner, vs. UNITED EMPLOYEES WELFARE ASSOCIATION and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS

On October 6, 1952, the United Employees Welfare Association, a legitimate labor union, filed a petition with the Department of Labor on behalf of 36 pinboys of the Isaac Peral Bowling Alley. The petition demanded conversion of wages from hourly to daily basis, vacation and sick leaves, medical benefits, and recognition of the union as the sole bargaining agency. The petition was certified to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) on October 10, 1952, docketed as Case No. 751-V. On the same day, the pinboys staged a strike. The CIR intervened, and the parties agreed the strikers would return to work under pre-strike conditions pending final disposition, and the management would not hire new pinboys without court authorization.
The company filed an answer, contending the pinboys were casual workers, their hourly wage system was due to the nature of the business, wages were lawful, and it opposed union recognition. After hearing, the CIR rendered a decision on August 22, 1955, finding the pinboys were permanent and regular employees, not casual workers. It detailed their work schedules and wages, and ordered the company to pay overtime compensation for work beyond eight hours and for night shift work. It also granted the pinboys yearly vacation and sick leave with pay and recognized the union as the sole bargaining agency. The company’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CIR en banc on September 23, 1955. The company then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. Whether the case should be governed by the certification provisions of Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) or Commonwealth Act No. 213 .
2. Whether the evidence supports the CIR’s conclusion that the pinboys are permanent workers who rendered service for more than eight hours.
3. Whether those working the night shift are entitled to 25% additional compensation.
4. Whether the CIR was correct in awarding vacation and sick leave to the pinboys.

RULING

1. On the governing law for union recognition: The Supreme Court held that Commonwealth Act No. 213 , which was in effect when the petition was filed and certified to the CIR in October 1952, governed the union’s right to collective bargaining. Under this law, it was sufficient for a labor union to be duly organized and registered with the Department of Labor. Republic Act No. 875 , which introduced requirements like majority employee selection for exclusive bargaining representation, took effect later, on January 17, 1953. Since the action was pending before its effectivity, the CIR validly acquired jurisdiction and could recognize the union under the prior law.
2. On the status of pinboys and overtime: The Court found that the CIR’s findings on the pinboys being permanent employees and their work hours were supported by substantial evidence. These are factual determinations that the Supreme Court will not review. The CIR’s order for overtime pay was sustained.
3. On night shift differential: The Court held that the CIR’s award of a 25% additional compensation for night work was in accordance with the law and the evidence. This was also a factual matter sustained by the Supreme Court.
4. On vacation and sick leave: The Court modified the CIR’s decision on this point. While acknowledging the CIR had broad powers to grant such benefits when the case was decided, the Court considered the company’s reported financial losses in 1952 and 1953. It ruled that the ability of the employer to pay must be considered. Therefore, the grant of sick and vacation leaves with pay was set aside and left to future bargaining agreements between the parties.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The decision appealed from was modified. The grant of sick and vacation leaves to the pinboys was set aside and left for future bargaining. The orders regarding overtime and night differential pay were affirmed, subject to computation in the lower court following finality of this decision and in line with the doctrine in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union. No costs.