G.R. No. L-9699; August 26, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
The defendants were convicted in the justice of the peace court of Batangas for violating a municipal ordinance regulating fishing privileges. They appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Batangas. The provincial fiscal filed complaints alleging that the defendants fished with small nets by torchlight or with specific gear (bayacus, alangang munti) within designated fish weir areas (Nos. 106, 111, 112) leased to Lino Mendoza, without his knowledge or consent, even though Mendoza had not installed a weir at the time. The complaints cited violations of Section 10 (granting exclusive fishing rights in the 50-meter weir area to the licensee, even without installation) in relation to Section 15 (penalizing fishing without a surface water license) of Municipal Ordinance No. 4 of Batangas.

The defendants demurred, arguing the facts did not constitute an offense, primarily because the ordinance was unconstitutional, illegal, and inapplicable. The CFI dismissed all complaints, holding that Section 10 of the ordinance was an illegal, null, and void provision. Alternatively, it ruled that even if valid, an infraction of Section 10 was not penalized by the sanction in Section 15. The prosecution appealed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in taking judicial notice of the municipal ordinance.
2. Whether the Court of First Instance erred in discussing and declaring Section 10 of the ordinance illegal and void.
3. Whether the dismissal of the complaints was proper.

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the dismissal of the complaints, but on grounds different from the lower court.

1. On Judicial Notice: The Court held that the CFI did not err in taking judicial notice of the municipal ordinance. While the Municipal Code (Act No. 82) for provincial municipalities lacks an express provision like that in the Manila Charter, this silence does not deprive provincial Courts of First Instance of such authority. Given their appellate jurisdiction over cases from inferior courts (like the justice of the peace), which involve municipal ordinances, it is proper for them to take judicial notice of such ordinances within their districts to effectively exercise that jurisdiction.

2. On the Validity of Section 10: The Court REVERSED the lower court’s finding that Section 10 was illegal and void. The Court found the provision valid. The grant of an exclusive fishing privilege in a specific area, even before installing a weir, was a legitimate exercise of municipal power under the Municipal Code to regulate fishing and grant fishery privileges. The method of granting licenses via public auction, as required by the ordinance and related law, guarded against abuse. The possibility of abusive combinations by a grantee does not render the ordinance itself illegal, as there are legal remedies to address such abuses.

Separate Opinion (Carson, J., concurring):
Justice Carson concurred in the result. He cautioned that the ruling on judicial notice should be strictly limited to cases analogous to the present one. He also noted that, following precedent (U.S. v. Tamporong), the appeal might have been dismissed outright once the Court determined the ordinance was valid, as the government’s appeal was based solely on the alleged invalidity. However, since the final judgment had the same effect, he did not dissent.