G.R. No. L-9514; February 10, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO LEDESMA and MATEO BERNAD, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
The defendants, Maximo Ledesma and Mateo Bernad, were convicted in the Court of First Instance of the crime of lesiones graves (grave physical injuries) and sentenced to one year and one day of prision correccional. The evidence conclusively established their guilt for the assault on the complaining witness. The trial judge found that the injuries inflicted incapacitated the victim from work for more than thirty days, a finding supported by the record.

Before the trial in the Court of First Instance, appellant Mateo Bernad had already been tried and convicted in the justice of the peace court of Misamis for lesiones leves (slight physical injuries) arising from the same assault. Bernad filed a plea of double jeopardy, arguing that his conviction in the lower court barred his subsequent prosecution for lesiones graves in the higher court based on the same act.

ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of Mateo Bernad in the justice of the peace court for lesiones leves bars his subsequent prosecution in the Court of First Instance for lesiones graves based on the same assault, on the ground of double jeopardy.

RULING:
No. The plea of double jeopardy is not tenable.

The Supreme Court, citing the doctrine established in United States vs. Diaz (15 Phil. Rep., 123; affirmed in 223 U.S., 442), ruled that the crimes of lesiones graves and lesiones leves are distinct offenses, even though they arise from the same act. They are distinct both in law and in fact. The principal element of lesiones gravesthe victim’s incapacity for labor for more than thirty dayswas not and could not have been part of the offense of lesiones leves for which Bernad was initially tried. At the time of the trial in the justice of the peace court, the full extent of the injury (incapacity exceeding thirty days) may not have been ascertainable, and thus the graver offense had not fully materialized.

Furthermore, under the law then in force, the justice of the peace had jurisdiction to try the accused for lesiones leves but lacked jurisdiction to try him for the more serious crime of lesiones graves. The jeopardy incident to the trial before the justice of the peace, therefore, extended only to the offense within its jurisdiction (lesiones leves) and did not attach to the offense beyond its jurisdiction (lesiones graves).

Consequently, the trial court correctly rejected the plea of double jeopardy. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, with costs proportionately assessed against each appellant.

Separate Concurring Opinion:
Justice Moreland concurred in the result but on a different ground. He believed the plea of double jeopardy was invalid due to collusion between the accused and the justice of the peace in the conduct of the first case.