G.R. No. L-937; December 17, 1946
MANUEL D. FELICIANO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO CABRERA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On March 5, 1946, petitioners (landlords) filed an ejectment complaint against respondent Eusebio R. Irabagon (tenant) in the Municipal Court of Manila. On March 23, 1946, the parties submitted a written compromise agreement, which the court approved and rendered as its judgment. The agreement granted the tenant an extension of occupancy until August 31, 1946, with a monthly rent of P60 payable in advance. It stipulated that if the tenant failed to comply, execution of the judgment would be issued immediately upon the landlords’ petition, without notice to the tenant. The judgment also ordered both parties not to appeal and provided that if other premises owned by the landlords became vacant before August 31, 1946, they would be leased to the tenant. The tenant continued occupying the premises beyond August 31, 1946. On September 2, 1946, the landlords filed a petition for execution, which was granted and a writ issued. On September 4, 1946, the tenant filed a motion to stay execution, invoking Commonwealth Act No. 689 and asking for a three-month extension, citing difficulties in finding another house. By order dated September 10, 1946, the respondent judge granted the motion and extended the time to vacate until November 30, 1946.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the stay of execution under Commonwealth Act No. 689 after the parties had voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement granting a specific extension period and the tenant had failed to comply.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, annulled the respondent judge’s order of September 10, 1946, and instructed the immediate issuance of a writ of execution. The Court held that the compromise agreement, which granted the tenant an extension of five months and eight days (from March 23 to August 31, 1946), more than fulfilled the maximum three-month extension allowed under Commonwealth Act No. 689. By voluntarily agreeing to this specific extension and stipulating that execution would issue immediately upon non-compliance without notice, the tenant effectively waived any further right to seek an extension under the Act. The Court found that the respondent judge gravely abused the discretion conferred by the Act when he granted the stay. Furthermore, the order violated section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, as it failed to require the tenant to deposit the rents due during the period of suspension as a condition for the stay. The promise of the landlords to lease other premises to the tenant was limited to the period “before August 31, 1946,” and thus no longer applicable.