GR L 9331; (July, 1957) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-9331; July 31, 1957.
JOSE A. ORTALIZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CORADO ECHARRI, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Jose A. Ortaliz filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against defendant-appellee Corado Echarri. The complaint alleged that on December 18, 1953, in Bacolod City, a Studebaker sedan car owned by the defendant and driven by his employee, Segundino Estanda, struck the plaintiff’s son, Winston Ortaliz, causing physical injuries. The driver was charged with Slight Physical Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No. 2607 of the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. The plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant, as employer, actual damages for medical expenses (P446.58), moral damages (P2,000), and attorney’s fees (P500). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it sought to enforce a subsidiary civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code, which requires the employer to be engaged in some kind of industry and the crime committed in the discharge of duties related to that industry—conditions not alleged. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint states a cause of action against the defendant-employer for damages arising from the negligent act of his employee.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case. The complaint states a cause of action under Articles 2176, 2180, and 2184 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 explicitly holds employers liable for damages caused by employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, “even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.” This provision refutes the defendant’s contention that liability under the complaint is solely subsidiary criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, which requires engagement in industry. Furthermore, the civil action is not barred by the prior criminal judgment against the driver. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages is separate and distinct from the criminal action and may proceed independently.