G.R. No. L-9307; March 19, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO GARCIA and URSULA BUAN, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
The appellants, Francisco Garcia and Ursula Buan, were convicted of the crime of concubinage. The evidence established that Francisco Garcia abandoned his lawful wife, Benita Dizon, and lived openly and scandalously with Ursula Buan as husband and wife, resulting in the birth of a child. The criminal prosecution originated from a formal complaint under oath filed by the offended party, Benita Dizon, in the justice of the peace court on December 23, 1911, charging a violation of Article 437 of the Penal Code. After a preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace found probable cause and issued an order for the appellants to appear before the Court of First Instance. Subsequently, the provincial fiscal, based on the record which included Dizon’s complaint, prepared and filed an information in the Court of First Instance formally charging the appellants with the same offense. The appellants contested the jurisdiction of the trial court, arguing that the information was defective because it was signed by the fiscal and not by the offended party.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the appellants and the subject matter of the action, given that the information filed in the Court of First Instance was signed by the provincial fiscal and not by the offended party.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. It held that the trial court validly acquired jurisdiction. The criminal prosecution was properly instituted when the offended party, Benita Dizon, filed her sworn complaint in the justice of the peace court. Once the prosecution was thus initiated, vesting the courts with jurisdiction over the persons and the subject matter, the provincial fiscal was authorized to file the information in the Court of First Instance to serve as the basis for continuing the proceedings to their final determination. The objection raised by the appellants was therefore without merit. The penalties imposed by the trial court were sustained.