G.R. No. L-9298; February 11, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BRAULIO DE VIVAR, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
The defendant-appellant, Braulio de Vivar, was charged with the crime of abduction. The information alleged that early in the morning of December 30, 1911, in Magalang, Pampanga, he abducted Teodora Bondoc, a 22-year-old unmarried woman, against her will and with unchaste designs, removing her from the control of her father. The evidence established that De Vivar, a train conductor, served as an intermediary between Teodora and her suitor, Benigno Indiongco. On the said date, De Vivar deceived Teodora into leaving her home by telling her that Indiongco was waiting for her nearby. Upon reaching a secluded spot, and finding Indiongco absent, Teodora attempted to return home. De Vivar then forcibly prevented her, slapped her, dragged her into a sugarcane field, and, by threatening her with a dagger, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. He then kept her hidden in the field until nightfall, after which he took her by cart to a relative’s house in Capas, Tarlac. There, he detained her for three days, during which he repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her through intimidation, until she was discovered and rescued by her family.

ISSUE:
Whether the acts committed by the defendant constitute the crime of abduction under Article 445 of the Penal Code, or some other crime such as rape.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding the defendant guilty of the crime of abduction as defined and penalized under Article 445 of the Penal Code. The Court ruled that the essential elements of the crime were present: (1) the victim was a woman; (2) she was taken against her will; and (3) the act was committed with unchaste designs. The Court found that the abduction commenced from the moment De Vivar, by force and against Teodora’s will, prevented her from returning home and took her to the sugarcane field. His subsequent acts of detaining her for several days in different locations, continuously against her will and for the purpose of satisfying his lust, completed the crime of abduction. The fact that Teodora initially left her house voluntarily, having been deceived, did not negate the crime, as the deprivation of her liberty and the unchaste designs were executed against her will thereafter. The crime is distinct from abduction with consent (Article 446) and from simple rape, as the prolonged deprivation of liberty in connection with the lewd purpose is the defining characteristic of abduction under Article 445. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium degree was properly imposed. The Court modified the judgment only to the extent that the defendant shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in paying the indemnity.