G.R. No. L-9278, December 7, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO BARREDO, PEDRO UREA and ALBINO SARMIENTO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
The defendants-appellants were convicted by the trial court of the crime of attempted rape and sentenced each to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, with accessory penalties. The conviction was based primarily on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, which the trial judge found credible. A significant volume of evidence was presented by both sides. Prior to trial, the provincial fiscal, after conducting his own investigation, refused to file an information, believing the accused were innocent and victims of a conspiracy by political enemies. Upon petition of the private prosecutrix’s counsel, the trial judge, invoking Act No. 1699, appointed a special fiscal to prosecute the case. The special fiscal then filed the information leading to the trial and conviction. On appeal, the appellants challenged the credibility of the witnesses and, crucially, assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court. They contended that the appointment of the special fiscal was improvident and without legal basis, thereby rendering the court without jurisdiction to try the case.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial judge erred in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
2. Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the information was filed by a special fiscal whose appointment was allegedly invalid.

RULING:
The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the trial court.

1. On the Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found no justification to overturn the findings of the trial judge, who had the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses. A meticulous review of the extensive record did not reveal any error in the trial court’s assessment of the evidence, which established the guilt of the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. On the Jurisdiction and Appointment of the Special Fiscal: The Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction. The power to appoint a temporary fiscal is expressly conferred upon judges of the Court of First Instance by Section 1 of Act No. 1699, which applies when the provincial fiscal is absent, fails or refuses to discharge his duty, or is disqualified. Citing Nuñez vs. Low, the Court reiterated that this power is not only authorized but required in such circumstances to ensure the machinery of justice is not impeded.
The appointment was valid. The provincial fiscal had explicitly refused to file an information based on his conclusion of the accused’s innocence. The trial judge, after considering the positions of both the private prosecutor and the provincial fiscal, properly exercised his discretion in appointing a special fiscal “in the interests of justice.”
The Court further ruled that even if the appointment were considered unwise or based on a misapprehension of facts, this would not affect its legality or the court’s jurisdiction, absent a manifest abuse of discretionwhich was not present in this case.
* The Court agreed with the principle that a fiscal should not prosecute if convinced of an accused’s innocence. However, once a complaint is properly filed and the fiscal refuses to act, the judge has the duty to appoint a special fiscal to proceed, as the evidence presented (which the trial court and the Supreme Court found sufficient for conviction) constituted probable cause to hold the accused for trial.

Finding no prejudicial error, the conviction was upheld.