G.R. No. L-9268; November 28, 1959
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an unmarried employee of Victory Shipping Lines, Inc., was sleeping aboard the petitioner’s vessel, M/V “Miss Leyte,” when it caught fire. Awakened by the fire, he jumped overboard and had not been heard from since. His father, respondent Juan Icong, was his partial dependent. On April 30, 1954, Juan Icong filed a notice of claim for death compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The petitioner reported the accident to the Commission only on August 17, 1954. The Commission awarded Juan Icong P2,038.40 in compensation, plus P200 for burial expenses and P20 as a legal fee. The petitioner appealed, raising three legal points: (1) the Commission erred in not applying Article 391 of the Civil Code on the presumption of death; (2) the petitioner was denied due process as it received no notice of hearing, violating Section 49 of Republic Act No. 772; and (3) Pedro Icong was guilty of notorious negligence by jumping overboard.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Workmen’s Compensation Commission correctly determined the death of Pedro Icong without applying the four-year presumption of death under Article 391 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether the petitioner was denied due process for allegedly not receiving notice of the hearing.
3. Whether Pedro Icong’s act of jumping overboard constituted notorious negligence barring compensation.

RULING

1. On the presumption of death: The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision not to apply Article 391 of the Civil Code. The rule on presumption of death after four years applies when a vessel is “lost,” meaning its fate is unknown, it is missing, or there is no trace of it. Here, the vessel’s fate was known—it was destroyed by fire and washed ashore. Given that Pedro Icong was last seen jumping overboard into a perilous situation and was never heard from again despite diligent search, the fact of his death was properly established by preponderance of evidence, not by the Civil Code presumption. The Court cited its ruling in Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, which held that an inference of immediate death may be drawn when a person was last seen in imminent peril and subsequently disappears.
2. On the lack of notice and hearing: The Court found no merit in the petitioner’s claim. The records showed the petitioner failed to file the employer’s report of the accident within the period prescribed by Section 45 of Act No. 4328, as amended. Furthermore, the petitioner did not timely controvert the claim on jurisdictional grounds. Consequently, the employer was barred from subsequently complaining that the law was strictly construed against it.
3. On the alleged notorious negligence: The Court ruled that Pedro Icong’s act of jumping overboard upon waking to find the vessel on fire did not constitute gross or notorious negligence. The Commission correctly characterized the act as being “impelled by fright or by the instinct of self-preservation.” The burden of proving notorious negligence rests on the employer, and the correct presumption is that a laborer, by instinct, takes precaution to avoid danger when warned. No such proof was presented.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission was affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.