GR L 922; (December, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-922; December 3, 1946
SUSANO AMOR, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and SHIU CHE KONG (alias TIU TIONG IU), respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Susano Amor filed a detainer action against respondents Shiu Che Kong (alias Tiu Tiong Iu) and Francisco Gonzales. The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment on appeal, the dispositive part of which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the house at No. 2248 Avenida Rizal, Manila, to the plaintiff; condemned Shiu Che Kong to pay rentals at the rate of P140 per month from July 1945 until restitution, and to return excess amounts received from March to July 1945 with legal interest; ordered Francisco Gonzales not to interfere with the possession and disposition of the house; and sentenced the defendants to pay costs. Only Francisco Gonzales appealed this judgment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on August 2, 1946. Petitioner moved for execution on August 5, which the respondent court granted on August 6. However, on August 10, respondent Tiu Tiong Iu moved to stay execution, alleging: (1) a contract of lease existed between him and petitioner; (2) petitioner was estopped from seeking execution; (3) the judgment’s terms prevented execution against him; and (4) the judgment had already been executed through the alleged lease. Petitioner objected. On August 20, the respondent court denied the writ of execution it had previously granted, effectively staying execution on the ground of an alleged landlord-tenant relationship. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent court acted illegally in denying the issuance (or staying/quashing) of a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court’s order denying the writ of execution was illegal. A court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash or stay it, except in specific circumstances such as a change in the parties’ situation making execution inequitable, or when the writ is improvidently issued, defective, against the wrong party, or the judgment has been satisfied. None of these circumstances were present. The judgment was clear, specific, and definitive. Furthermore, the judgment was final and executory as to respondent Tiu Tiong Iu because he did not appeal. The phrase in the judgment “sin perjuicio de cualquier arreglo legal que las partes pudieran tener” (without prejudice to any legal arrangement the parties might have) did not indicate a pre-existing landlord-tenant contract but referred to a future possibility. Respondent Tiu Tiong Iu’s failure to press for dismissal based on any alleged pre-trial understanding and his failure to appeal deprived him of the right to rely on it. The Supreme Court directed the respondent court to issue the writ of execution as prayed for by the petitioner, with costs against respondent Tiu Tiong Iu.
