GR L 9050; (July, 1955) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-9050; July 30, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JUAN L. BOCAR, Vacation Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch and OSCAR CASTELO, respondents.
FACTS
In Criminal Case No. 3023-P, Oscar Castelo and others were charged with murder. After trial, Judge Emilio Rilloraza found Castelo and others guilty and sentenced them to death on March 31, 1955. Castelo filed a motion for bail, which was granted by respondent Judge Juan L. Bocar (acting as vacation judge) over the prosecution’s objection. Castelo then filed a motion for new trial based on the recanting affidavit of Rogelio Robles, a co-accused turned prosecution witness who claimed his testimony was false and given under duress. After a hearing, Judge Bocar granted the motion for new trial on April 20, 1955, set aside the conviction as to Castelo, and scheduled a new trial. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that Judge Bocar had no jurisdiction to grant a new trial in a case involving a death sentence, or alternatively, that he gravely abused his discretion in doing so.
ISSUE
Whether a trial court that has imposed a death sentence retains jurisdiction to entertain and grant a motion for new trial filed by the convicted defendant.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a trial court retains jurisdiction to entertain and grant a motion for new trial even in cases where it has imposed the death penalty. The automatic review by the Supreme Court of a death sentence under Section 9, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court is intended primarily for the protection of the accused and to ensure the correctness of the decision. This protective purpose does not deprive the accused of the right to move for a new trial before the trial court. To hold otherwise would place a defendant sentenced to death at a disadvantage compared to those sentenced to lesser penalties, as the latter can file a motion for new trial with the trial court and, if denied, renew it on appeal, whereas the former would have only one chance before the Supreme Court. The period for transmitting the record to the Supreme Court (within 20 days after rendition of sentence) is not rigid or jurisdictional and is interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial. The petition was denied, and the preliminary injunction was dissolved. The Court deemed it unnecessary to rule on the legality of the bail order, as the grant of a new trial reverted the case to its pre-judgment status, where Castelo was originally on bail.