G.R. No. L-9003, December 3, 1914
LUIS RIVAYA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIX SAMSON, RAFAEL VILLANUEVA, ANICETO G. MEDEL, defendants. FELIX SAMSON, appellant.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Luis Rivaya filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Albay to recover possession, as owner, of three parcels of land and damages for their illegal detention. Defendant Rafael Villanueva recognized Rivaya’s rights. Defendant Aniceto G. Medel pleaded ignorance and asked the court to determine the true owner. Defendant Felix Samson claimed ownership of lands in the same sitio but denied they were the same lands described in the complaint. The primary issue being the identity of the lands, the parties agreed to the appointment of Jose Sarte as a commissioner to: (1) prepare a map of the lands; (2) examine witnesses regarding ownership and a public sale; (3) determine if Samson’s land was the same as Rivaya’s; and (4) include other facts as requested. The parties further agreed that the court would render final judgment based on the commissioner’s report. After the commissioner submitted his report, Samson objected and secured an order for a further investigation and a second report. Samson also objected to the second report. The lower court overruled the objection, adopted the facts in the second report, found Rivaya to be the owner entitled to possession, and ordered Samson to return the lands and pay costs. Samson appealed, arguing the lower court erred in basing its judgment on the commissioner’s report, which was not appointed in accordance with the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, and that the commissioner failed to consider all his evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in rendering judgment based on the report of a commissioner appointed by agreement of the parties, notwithstanding non-compliance with the procedural rules for appointing commissioners.

RULING:
No, the trial court did not err. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court held that while the commissioner was not appointed in accordance with Sections 135 and 136 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, his appointment and the agreement for the court to base its judgment on his report were made with the consent of the parties. The Court recognized the practical necessity and convenience of such a method, especially when lands in question are situated far from the provincial capital, to avoid great inconvenience to the court, the parties, and witnesses. The appellant failed to demonstrate that the evidence allegedly not considered by the commissioner was so material that its consideration would have changed the outcome of the case. Therefore, there was no justification to reverse the judgment merely because one party was dissatisfied with the commissioner’s report. The decision of the lower court was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

Concurring Opinion (Carson, J., with Trent, J., concurring):
Justice Carson concurred on the specific ground that the facts in the commissioner’s report were effectively facts stipulated by the parties upon which the case was submitted for judgment.