G.R. No. L-898; March 31, 1947
ELISEO TORRES y HONORATA PAGLINAWAN, petitioners, vs. EMILIO PEÑA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, PERLA DE JESUS y GERONIMO GIMENO, respondents.

FACTS

The spouses Geronimo Gimeno and Perla de Jesus (respondents) filed an action for detainer (detentacion) against the spouses Eliseo Torres and Honorata Paglinawan (petitioners) before the Municipal Court of Manila on February 23, 1946. The petitioners, as defendants, alleged in their defense that they were the owners and possessors of the property as such owners, and that the title of ownership relied upon by the plaintiffs was fraudulent, fictitious, obtained without valuable consideration, and therefore fatally null and void. Consequently, they challenged the municipal court’s jurisdiction. The municipal court disregarded the jurisdictional objection and rendered a summary judgment against the defendants, ordering them to vacate the property. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, raising the same defense of ownership and alleging that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal since the municipal court of origin had tried and decided the case without jurisdiction. During the trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence showing: (a) the property was originally registered in the name of the defendants under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 60559; (b) the property was mortgaged to one Isidro Estanislao, who held the title; (c) during the Japanese occupation, one Vicente Sto. Bernardo bought the property from the defendants, but the defendants continued to occupy it; (d) despite the sale, Sto. Bernardo did not have the title transferred to his name, and the duplicate certificate remained with the mortgagee Estanislao; (e) on January 28, 1946, Sto. Bernardo paid Estanislao P1,200 to redeem the property and received the title with the mortgage cancellation; (f) the next day, January 29, 1946, Sto. Bernardo sold the property to the respondents, in whose favor Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78696 was issued, but with the annotation: “Subject to further disposition by the Commonwealth Government as to real estate transactions consummated during the Japanese occupation”; (g) throughout these transactions, the petitioners continued to occupy the property without paying rent. After the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants tried to present their own evidence to support their defense of ownership and the nullity of the title. The respondent judge, upon objection by the plaintiffs, rejected the defendants’ evidence on the question of ownership, ruling that the complaint was for detainer and evidence should be confined solely to the question of possession. The plaintiffs later moved for immediate execution of the municipal court’s judgment due to non-payment of rents. The defendants objected, reiterating lack of jurisdiction. The respondent judge ordered immediate execution, which was reaffirmed despite a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE

Whether the case involves a summary action for possession under Rule 72, Section 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly applicable law), or essentially involves the question of ownership (title to property), which would deprive the municipal court and, consequently, the Court of First Instance on appeal, of jurisdiction.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the case essentially involves the question of ownership, depriving the inferior court of jurisdiction. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine established in Supia and Batioco v. Quintero and Ayala (59 Phil. 326). The rule is that a mere allegation in the answer that the defendant claims to be the owner does not deprive the justice of the peace or municipal court of jurisdiction in a summary possession case. However, if during the trial and upon the development of the evidence, it appears that the question of possession cannot be resolved without first determining the title to the property, such jurisdiction is lost and the case should be dismissed. Applying this doctrine, the evidence presented, even by the plaintiffs themselves, shows that determination of the possessory issue depends inexorably on determining the title. The petitioners were original Torrens titleholders, continued in physical possession despite a disputed sale during the Japanese occupation, and the title was never transferred to the buyer, Sto. Bernardo, until after a series of transactions in which the petitioners were not involved. The respondents’ Torrens title itself is not incontestable, as it bears an annotation subjecting it to further government disposition regarding Japanese occupation transactions, and its validity is directly attacked by the petitioners. Since the respondents and their predecessor never had possession, they cannot claim a disturbed possession remediable by a detainer action; their claim to possession derives from their title, the nullity of which is a question of ownership beyond municipal court jurisdiction. To avoid delay, unnecessary expense, and waste of judicial resources, and considering that evidence on ownership had already begun to be presented without objection to the Court of First Instance’s exercise of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court ordered: (a) the annulment of the order for immediate execution; (b) the case to proceed in the Court of First Instance of Manila as if it were an action for reivindicacion (recovery of ownership), allowing the parties to present all evidence on ownership; and (c) costs against the respondents.