G.R. No. L-8876; October 31, 1957
ALLIED FREE WORKER’S UNION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE SEGUNDO APOSTOL, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On August 11, 1952, Compania Maritima (the company) entered into a one-month “arrastre and stevedoring contract” with the Allied Free Worker’s Union (the union) for services in Iligan City. The contract was renewable and revocable by the company if the union failed to render good services. After its expiration on September 12, 1952, the contract was not formally renewed, but the union continued performing the services until August 24, 1954, when the company served a written notice terminating the contract effective August 31, 1954. The company then entered into a similar contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association.
On July 23, 1954, the union sent a letter to the company requesting recognition as the exclusive bargaining unit for loading and unloading cargo at the port of Iligan City. When the company did not respond within the 10-day period, the union filed a petition on August 6, 1954, with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR Case No. 175-MC) for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining unit. Instead of answering, the company gave the termination notice. The union protested and filed charges of unfair labor practice against the company with the CIR on August 26, 1954. Union members and sympathizers subsequently engaged in picketing at the wharf, preventing the loading and unloading of cargo.
On September 8, 1954, the company filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Lanao (Civil Case No. 5377) seeking to enjoin the picketing, recover damages, and rescind the 1952 contract. The company also prayed for a preliminary injunction. On September 9, 1954, the court granted the preliminary injunction ex parte upon the filing of a P20,000 bond. The union filed an urgent motion to dissolve the injunction, arguing that the CIR had exclusive jurisdiction over the labor dispute under Republic Act No. 875. The court denied the motion, offering instead to allow the union to lift the injunction by filing a P40,000 counterbond. The union filed a motion to dismiss on the same jurisdictional grounds, which was denied on December 15, 1954. The union then filed the present petition for prohibition to set aside the order and prohibit the respondent judge from proceeding with the civil case.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5377 (involving damages from picketing and rescission of contract) despite a pending labor dispute before the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. Whether the lower court could grant an injunction in connection with the picketing and, if so, whether the ex parte injunction issued was valid.

RULING

1. On Jurisdiction: The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, citing Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, held that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under Republic Act No. 875 is limited to specific cases: (1) labor disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest as certified by the President; (2) controversies over minimum wage under Republic Act No. 602; (3) disputes involving hours of employment under Commonwealth Act No. 444; and (4) cases involving unfair labor practice under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 875. All other cases arising from labor disputes fall under the jurisdiction of regular courts. The instant case in the Court of First Instance sought damages from picketing and rescission of a contract, which did not fall under any of the four exclusive categories of the CIR’s jurisdiction, even though a related certification election petition (CIR Case No. 175-MC) and an unfair labor practice charge were pending before the CIR.
2. On the Injunction: While the Court of First Instance could grant an injunction because it had jurisdiction over the main case, the ex parte preliminary injunction issued was void. The case involved a labor dispute arising from picketing. Therefore, the procedure for issuing injunctions in labor disputes under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 must be followed, not the ex parte procedure under Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. Section 9(d) requires a hearing where both parties have an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the court must make specific findings of fact before an injunction can be issued. Since the injunction was granted ex parte without such a hearing, it was invalid.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for prohibition was denied regarding the question of the lower court’s jurisdiction to entertain the civil case. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court was declared void for non-compliance with Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875. No pronouncement as to costs.