G.R. No. L-884; June 30, 1947
PATRICIO CONTRERAS and JERUSALEM GINGCO, petitioners, vs. ALFONSO FELIX, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and THE CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Patricio Contreras and Jerusalem Gingco sued the China Banking Corporation, Inc. and spouses Juan V. Molina and Teodora Arenas to annul a mortgage executed by the spouses in favor of the Bank and to recover damages. The Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Jose O. Vera, absolved the Bank and condemned the spouses Molina to pay various amounts to Gingco. The plaintiffs appealed specific parts of this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rendered a judgment modifying the lower court’s decision, declaring the mortgage null and void as to Gingco’s one-half share and rescinded as to the Molina spouses’ one-half share, and ordering “all the defendants” to pay Gingco P6,951.31 plus monthly amounts. After this judgment became final and was remanded for execution, the sheriff initially sought to collect one-half of the judgment from the China Banking Corporation. The Bank objected. Respondent Judge Alfonso Felix then ordered that the Bank’s liability was only for one-third of the judgment, which the Bank paid and the plaintiffs’ counsel receipted. As the other defendants were insolvent, the plaintiffs moved for an alias execution against the Bank for the unpaid balance, which was denied. The petitioners then filed this mandamus proceeding, contending the Bank’s liability was joint and several under Article 1902 of the Civil Code because its act was tortious.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court’s final judgment, which ordered “all the defendants” to pay certain amounts, imposes joint and several liability on the defendants, thereby authorizing the lower court or the Supreme Court to modify the judgment to specify such solidary liability after it has become executory.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court’s judgment imposes merely joint (mancomunada) liability, not joint and several (solidaria) liability. It is a well-established doctrine that when a judgment does not expressly provide that defendants are liable jointly and severally, none of them can be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This ruling is in harmony with Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the lower court had no legal authority to make the change sought by the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself may not make such a change after the judgment has become executory. The alleged mistake, if any, is not a clerical error but goes to the very substance of the controversy. Only clerical errors, mistakes, or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected after a judgment is entered. The power to correct clerical errors does not authorize a court to repair its own inaction or to add something to a judgment which was not originally included, even if it could and should have done so initially. Such an omission constitutes a judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision. Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments become final at a definite date to put an end to controversies. The rule of finality must be adhered to regardless of any possible injustice in a particular case, subordinating the equity of a specific situation to the overriding need for certainty and immutability of judicial pronouncements. The petition for mandamus was therefore denied. (A dissenting opinion argued that the omission to specify solidary liability was involuntary and could be corrected, as solidarity arises by operation of law in tort cases under Article 1902, and correcting it would not add anything new to the judgment but would merely apply the law automatically.)