G.R. No. L-8546; April 20, 1956
Genoveva S. Villalon and Augusto Villalon, petitioners, vs. Honorable Bonifacio Ysip and William Golangco, respondents.

FACTS

In Civil Case No. 21363 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the trial was set for March 25, 1954. When the case was called, the defendants’ (petitioners) counsel was ready, and the plaintiff (respondent Golangco) presented his evidence. After the plaintiff rested, the defendants’ counsel moved for a continuance, alleging he agreed to trial believing the plaintiff would not finish with his witnesses. The motion was denied, and the case was submitted for decision. A motion for reconsideration, stating defendant Genoveva S. Villalon was sick, was also denied. The next day, March 26, 1954, defendants filed an urgent motion for reopening on the same ground of Mrs. Villalon’s illness, which was opposed and later denied, with notice received on March 30, 1954. On June 10, 1954, the court rendered its decision, received by defendants on June 15, 1954. On June 25, 1954, they filed a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial based on the same ground of illness, which was denied, with notice served on July 7, 1954. On July 16, 1954, defendants filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond, and the record on appeal the next day, July 17, 1954. The plaintiff opposed the appeal as filed out of time. The Court of Appeals denied a petition for mandamus to compel certification of the record on appeal, ruling the appeal was perfected beyond the 30-day period because the motion for new trial filed on June 25, 1954, did not suspend the period, as the grounds had been previously raised in motions before judgment.

ISSUE

Does a motion for new trial or reconsideration, filed after judgment, on the ground that the defendants were not present at the trial due to illness, which ground was previously raised in motions before judgment (for continuance, reconsideration, and reopening), suspend the 30-day period for perfecting an appeal?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the certiorari, reversed the order of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the record on appeal to be certified. The Court held that while a pro forma motion for new trial (one that does not specifically point out findings or conclusions as required by Rule 37, Section 2) does not suspend the appeal period, a motion for new trial based on grounds previously raised before judgment is not expressly prohibited by the Rules. A ground insufficient for a continuance may be sufficient for setting aside a judgment if it results in injustice. The general rule is that a motion for new trial after judgment suspends the appeal period. Since there is no express prohibition against such a motion, the Court was unwilling to penalize a party by depriving them of their day in court and the opportunity for appellate review, holding that the motion for new trial filed on June 25, 1954, suspended the running of the period for perfecting the appeal.