G.R. No. L-8416; January 27, 1914
EUSEBIA BROCE Y APURADO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. DAMASO APURADO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

FACTS:
Eusebia Broce et al. (appellees) obtained a decree of registration under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) for a parcel of land in San Carlos, Occidental Negros. An initial appeal by Catalino Broce against the registration was affirmed by the Supreme Court on March 16, 1911. Subsequently, on April 24, 1911, Damaso Apurado et al. (appellants), who are the legal heirs of the original owner Carlos Apurado (maternal grandfather of the appellees), filed a petition under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act to reopen the decree. They alleged fraud in its procurement, claiming there was an agreement that the appellees would register the land for the benefit of all heirs. The appellees countered that their father, Gregorio Broce, validly purchased the land from Carlos Apurado in 1886, as evidenced by a notarial document.

ISSUE:

2. Whether the appellants have sufficiently proven their right to reopen the decree by establishing both a valid interest in the land and fraud in the procurement of the registration.

RULING:

2. On the Merits of the Petition: The Court denied the petition to reopen the decree. To succeed under Section 38, a petitioner must prove: (a) an estate or interest in the land, and (b) fraud in the procurement of the decree. The appellants failed on both counts.
Interest in the Land: The appellees presented a valid notarial document (Exhibit 5) dated 1886, showing a sale of the land by Carlos Apurado to Gregorio Broce. This document, even if considered a private instrument, was binding and effectively transferred ownership, negating the appellants’ claim of co-ownership by inheritance.
Fraud in Procurement: The Court found no adequate evidence to support the alleged agreement that the appellees would register the land for the joint benefit of both families. The appellants’ silence and failure to oppose the registration proceedings for nearly five years, despite knowledge thereof, was incompatible with the existence of such an agreement.

Therefore, the judgment of the lower court denying the petition to reopen the decree was AFFIRMED.