G.R. No. L-8229 November 28, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WILLIAM J. POMEROY, et al., defendants; LUIS M. TARUC, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
The prosecution appealed a decision from the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting defendant-appellee Luis M. Taruc of the crime of rebellion. Taruc was accused together with others in a third amended information for “rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings.” The information alleged that from on or about May 4, 1946, and continuously thereafter, the accused, as ranking officers and/or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB/Huks), conspired to commit rebellion by publicly rising and taking arms against the Government of the Philippines to remove its allegiance and laws. It enumerated specific overt acts, including ambushes, raids, attacks on military and police, killings (such as the ambush killing Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon and others), robberies, and other violent acts aimed at creating chaos to facilitate rebellion. Taruc, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty but later withdrew his plea and pleaded guilty to the charge of simple rebellion. The trial court, accepting his plea, found him guilty of simple rebellion as defined and punished under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to twelve years of prision mayor, a fine of P20,000, accessory penalties, and costs. The prosecution appealed, contending that the penalty imposed was erroneous and too lenient, arguing that the complex crime of rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies, and kidnappings was charged, and therefore the penalty should be the maximum period of reclusion temporal to death, or at least reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution can appeal from the judgment of conviction to seek the imposition of a higher penalty upon the accused.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the prosecution’s appeal. It held that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing a judgment of conviction if the appeal would place the accused in jeopardy of a second punishment for the same offense. The Court cited its previous ruling in Ang Cho Kio vs. Republic of the Philippines, which established that the government cannot appeal from a judgment in a criminal case if the appeal would subject the defendant to a second jeopardy for the same offense. Since Taruc had already been convicted and sentenced by the trial court, a prosecution appeal seeking a higher penalty would place him in double jeopardy. The Court found no compelling reason to re-examine or reverse this settled doctrine, which is a corollary of long-established practice and constitutional law in the Philippines and the United States. Consequently, the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court was beyond the Supreme Court’s power to review upon the prosecution’s appeal. The appeal was dismissed without costs.