G.R. No. L-8183; April 15, 1955
VICTOR DE LA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE AMBROSIO T. DOLLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and LEONARDO QUESADA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On February 15, 1954, the Justice of the Peace Court of Balanga, Bataan rendered a decision in a detainer case ordering petitioner Victor de la Cruz to vacate a fishpond and deliver it to respondents Leonardo Quesada, et al., and to pay them rental of P2,750 per annum from January 10, 1954, until delivery. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Bataan and deposited P912 as a supersedeas bond to stay execution. On June 14, 1954, respondents filed a motion for immediate execution, alleging petitioner failed to deposit the accrued rentals at a rate of P229.17 per month. Petitioner opposed, contending the rental fixed by the inferior court was yearly, not monthly, and the court could not modify that rate. The respondent judge granted the motion for execution in an order dated July 21, 1954. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for certiorari to nullify the order of execution.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the immediate execution of the judgment for failure to pay monthly deposits, when the judgment of the justice of the peace court fixed the rental on a yearly basis.

RULING

The petition is granted. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of execution. Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, which governs immediate execution in detainer cases, contemplates the payment of a monthly rental. The failure to pay such monthly rental is what authorizes execution. In this case, the Justice of the Peace Court fixed the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the fishpond at P2,750 per annum, not per month. The Court took judicial notice that fishpond operations and rentals are typically on a yearly basis. Since the judgment did not determine a monthly rental, the condition for execution under Section 8, Rule 72 was not triggered. The Court of First Instance could not, in advance of trial on appeal, modify the judgment by effectively converting the annual rental into monthly installments. The order of execution was therefore premature. The proper remedy for respondents to protect their interests during the appeal lies elsewhere under remedial law, not in an immediate execution based on an unauthorized monthly rental computation.