G.R. No. L-810, L-811, L-812, L-813; March 31, 1947
Case Parties/Title:

MANUEL ARTIGAS LOSADA, SANTIAGO AGUDA, GETULIO GEOCADA, and FRANCISCO DANAO, petitioners-appellees, vs. JUAN ACENAS, as Superintendent of Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

This is a consolidated appeal from an order dated July 20, 1946, issued by the justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan (acting in the absence of the judge of first instance under Act No. 2131 ), granting writs of habeas corpus and ordering the release of four inmates of the Davao Penal Colony at Inagawan, Palawan: Manuel Artigas Losada, Getulio Geocada, Santiago Aguda, and Francisco Danao. The petitioners were serving sentences for various crimes and had remaining prison terms, with good conduct allowances, extending to dates in 1947 and 1948. The lower court ordered their release based on their claim that they were entitled to a special time allowance—a deduction of one-fifth of their respective sentences—under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioners argued that they had remained in the penal colony and did not attempt to escape during the disorder caused by the war, which they contended was a calamity or catastrophe similar to those enumerated in the law. The respondent admitted the petitioners “remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war.”

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners, who did not escape from the penal institution during the disorder caused by the war, are entitled to the special time allowance (one-fifth deduction of their sentences) provided under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and denied the petitions for habeas corpus.
The Court held that the special allowance for loyalty under Articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code applies only to convicts who: (1) evade the service of their sentence by leaving the penal institution on the occasion of a disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which they did not participate; and (2) subsequently give themselves up to the authorities within forty-eight hours following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity. The petitioners did not escape; therefore, they do not fall within the explicit terms of the law. The Court emphasized that the equitable considerations and policy arguments advanced by the lower court—such as the petitioners’ demonstrated loyalty by not escaping—are matters more properly addressed to the legislative department for potential amendment or to the executive department in connection with petitions for parole or pardon. The judiciary may not read additional conditions or situations into the statute. The Court also noted there was no showing that the petitioners ever had the opportunity to escape or that, had they escaped, they would have voluntarily surrendered later out of loyalty. Thus, their case does not come within the letter or the spirit of the invoked law. The dissenting opinion argued for a liberal interpretation, contending that the spirit of the law intended to reward loyalty during calamities and that not escaping demonstrates greater loyalty than escaping and later surrendering, but the majority rejected this view.