GR L 8034; (November, 1955) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-8034 November 18, 1955
CORNELIA A. DE GILLACO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On April 1, 1946, at about 7:30 a.m., Tomas Gillaco was a passenger on a Manila Railroad Company train from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. Upon reaching Paco Railroad station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company assigned to the Manila-San Fernando, La Union line, was at the station waiting for a train to Tutuban Station to report for duty. Devesa had a long-standing personal grudge against Gillaco dating back to the Japanese occupation. Upon seeing Gillaco inside the train coach, Devesa shot him with a carbine furnished by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as a train guard. Gillaco died from the wound. It is undisputed that Devesa was finally convicted of homicide by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Manila Railroad Company, as the employer of the slayer Emilio Devesa, is liable for damages arising from the killing of its passenger, Tomas Gillaco.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Court held that the act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco because of a personal grudge was entirely unforeseeable by the Manila Railroad Company. The carrier had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor between its employees and passengers. The shooting was a “caso fortuito” (fortuitous event) under Article 1105 of the old Civil Code of 1889, being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the circumstances, thereby excusing the appellant’s breach of its contract of safe carriage. Furthermore, at the time of the crime, Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased; he was assigned to guard a different line (Manila-San Fernando) and was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to his duty’s starting point at Tutuban, with his tour of duty to begin two hours later. His position was that of another would-be passenger, not an employee assigned to discharge any duties under the carrier’s contract with the deceased. Therefore, his assault cannot be deemed a breach of the contract of transportation by a servant of the carrier. The Court distinguished American authorities imposing absolute liability on carriers as insurers, noting that such liability was not recognized under the Civil Code of 1889 in force at the time.