G.R. No. L-79576 August 3, 1988
CELSO M. LARGA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, ASSISTANT FISCAL EDWIN CONDAYA, Prosecuting Fiscal of Branch 137, and HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Celso M. Larga, an owner/operator of a business, was charged with violating Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752 (The Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980) for willfully failing to remit to the HDMF (Pag-IBIG Fund) employer-employee contributions amounting to approximately P26,880.00, computed as of April 1986. The information alleged that these mandatory contributions were regularly deducted from employees’ salaries from January 1984 onwards but were not remitted.
Larga filed a Motion to Quash the information, arguing that his criminal liability was extinguished by Executive Order No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986. He contended that Section 10 of E.O. 90 made HDMF contributions voluntary starting January 1987, thereby operating as an absolute repeal of the penal provision (Section 23 of P.D. 1752) for acts committed prior to that date. The Regional Trial Court denied his motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting Larga to file this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUE

Whether Executive Order No. 90, which made HDMF contributions voluntary effective January 1987, extinguished the criminal liability of the petitioner for failure to remit mandatory contributions that accrued prior to its effectivity.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Quash. The Court ruled that Executive Order No. 90 did not repeal Section 23 of P.D. 1752 retroactively. The amendatory law explicitly made contributions voluntary only commencing January 1987. Consequently, the mandatory nature of contributions and the corresponding penal sanction for non-remittance remained fully operative for obligations accruing before that date.
The legal logic is grounded in statutory construction and the principle against retroactive application of penal laws unless expressly declared. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect if favorable to the accused, this applies only when the later law clearly repeals or modifies the penal provision for acts already committed. Here, E.O. 90 contained no express retroactive clause extinguishing liability for past violations. Its language and intent were prospective, altering the system from mandatory to voluntary only from January 1987 forward. Therefore, the petitioner’s obligation to remit deductions made from 1984 to 1986, and his liability for failing to do so, persisted under the original mandatory scheme. The trial court retained jurisdiction to try the case.