G.R. No. L-783; December 18, 1946
A. V. BRODETT, SANTOS CARMELO, G. NARCISO and JOSE ELORIAGA, petitioners, vs. MARIANO L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and SABINA S. VDA. DE ESCALER, respondents.

FACTS

On July 24, 1945, an ejectment complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by Sabina S. de Escaler against Dan Zamora. The Municipal Court decided against Zamora, who appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 6, 1945, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision based on a written stipulation where the parties renounced their right to appeal, Zamora waived rights under Commonwealth Act No. 689 , and Zamora was allowed to remain in possession only until May 31, 1946. The four petitioners (Brodett, Carmelo, Narciso, and Eloriaga) were also occupying the premises with Zamora’s consent. The lower court ordered them to show cause why they should not be ejected. At a hearing, upon the court’s suggestion for an amicable settlement, the petitioners and the owner agreed that the petitioners would vacate by August 2, 1946, and if they could not find another house, they could occupy the plaintiff’s house in Quezon City at a monthly rental of P250. The lower court approved this agreement and issued an order on July 16, 1946, to make it effective. About a week later, on July 22, 1946, the petitioners filed a motion to set aside the July 16 order, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over their persons, the order denied them due process, and Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa lacked authority as he was appointed under the Commonwealth and not reappointed after independence. The motion was denied, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

1. Whether the lower court’s order of July 16, 1946, which approved the compromise agreement and ordered the petitioners to vacate, deprived the petitioners of due process of law.
2. Whether Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa had valid authority to issue the order, given his appointment under the Commonwealth Government.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and dissolved the preliminary injunction.
1. On the due process issue, the Court held that the petitioners were not deprived of due process. They were privies or successors of the defendant Zamora, occupying the premises as his house guests or subtenants without the owner’s knowledge. As such, they occupied a subsidiary or accessory legal position similar to a house guest, who has no independent right to remain after the principal tenant leaves, as established in De la Cruz vs. Roxas (75 Phil., 457). Furthermore, the petitioners voluntarily appeared before the lower court, entered into an amicable agreement to vacate, and secured the court’s approval. They had communicated with the plaintiff by letter requesting time to remain and were fully heard in court. Thus, the standard of due process—which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment after trial—was fully met.
2. On the authority of Judge De la Rosa, the Court held that his appointment was valid. The Constitution under which the Republic functions is the same Constitution that was in effect during the Commonwealth, as provided in Article XVIII, Section 1. The government established was initially called the Commonwealth and, upon independence, became the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, Judge De la Rosa’s appointment under the Commonwealth remained valid under the Republic, and he had authority to issue the order. The Court found no reason to disturb the lower court’s order and denied the petition with costs against the petitioners.