G.R. No. L-781; November 29, 1946
CEFERINO M. REGALA, recurrente, vs. EL JUEZ DEL JUZGADO DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE BATAAN, recurrido.

FACTS

The petitioner, Ceferino M. Regala, was accused in Criminal Case No. 4307 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan for the crime of murder. On May 20, 1946, he was informed of the complaint and pleaded not guilty. The witnesses named in the complaint were Wenceslao Cruz, Conrado Manalac, and others. On June 6, 1946, the trial date, the Provincial Fiscal, instead of presenting evidence, filed an amended complaint that included the previously named witnesses, Wenceslao Cruz and Conrado Manalac, as co-accused. This amended complaint alleged conspiracy, confederation, and mutual aid among the petitioner and his two co-accused in committing the crime. The court admitted the amended complaint. The petitioner objected, arguing that the amendment was substantial and prejudicial, and that the court should first discharge Cruz and Manalac to be utilized as state witnesses under the conditions of Article 9, Rule 115. The judge granted the petitioner’s request in an order dated June 6, 1946. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal against this order on June 14, which was denied on June 19. A motion for reconsideration filed on June 26 was also denied on July 11, 1946. The petitioner then filed this original petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the court’s orders of June 6 and July 11, 1946.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the respondent judge’s orders allowing the amendment of the criminal complaint after the petitioner had pleaded, and whether the judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The writ of certiorari only lies when a tribunal, in the exercise of judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the petitioner has the remedy of appeal. If convicted, he can appeal to the higher court and there raise all errors committed by the lower court; this is the ordinary remedy granted by law. The Court found that the respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction. The court had jurisdiction over the offense and the territory, and therefore had jurisdiction to decide incidental questions, such as the amendment of the complaint. Even if the decision on the amendment was erroneous, it would be an error of procedure, not an act in excess of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court held that the amendment was merely formal. It did not alter the nature of the crime charged (murder) nor the extent of the petitioner’s liability, as the amended complaint alleged conspiracy, making all participants equally responsible regardless of who inflicted the fatal wound. Since the amendment was formal, the court had the discretion to allow it under Section 13, Rule 106, and did not commit a grave abuse thereof. Any error in procedure can be corrected on appeal after a final judgment, not via certiorari. The petition was denied with costs against the petitioner.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
* Justice Feria (Concurring): Concurred in the result. He reasoned that an order allowing an amendment to an information is interlocutory and not appealable. The respondent judge did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction because the court had the power to decide the question of amendment. Regarding grave abuse of discretion, he posited that if the court had no power to allow a substantial amendment after plea (as per Rule 106, Sec. 13), then it had no discretion to do so, and therefore could not have abused a discretion it did not possess. Since the amendment in question was formal, the court had discretion and did not gravely abuse it.
* Justice Perfecto (Dissenting): Dissented, arguing that the amendment was substantial and prejudicial. It transformed the petitioner from a sole principal accused to a co-conspirator with the newly included accused, who were then discharged to become state witnesses. This radically changed the legal positions of the accused and the prosecution, strengthening the case against the petitioner by arming the prosecution with immunized witnesses. He argued that certiorari is the proper remedy because appeal is not an expedient and adequate remedy in this instance; the abuse of discretion could fundamentally disrupt the defense strategy, and the petitioner has a right to prevent this damage before it occurs. Appeal would only be a tardy curative remedy after potential irreparable harm.